Withdrawing from NAFTA by Peck, Alison
Masthead Logo
Faculty Scholarship
3-2019
Withdrawing from NAFTA
Alison Peck
West Virginia University College of Law, alison.peck@mail.wvu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law
Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Digital Commons Citation
Peck, Alison, "Withdrawing from NAFTA" (2019). Faculty Scholarship. 1102.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/faculty_publications/1102
Withdrawing from NAFTA 
ALISON PECK* 
Since the 2016 campaign, Donald Trump has threatened to withdraw 
from NAFTA. Can he? The question is complex. For one thing, NAFTA is 
not a treaty negotiated under the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, but 
rather a congressional–executive agreement, a creature of dubious con-
stitutionality and ill-defined withdrawal and termination parameters. 
This Article reviews the scope of those restrictions and concludes that 
unilateral presidential withdrawal from NAFTA, although not without 
support, is ultimately unlawful. On one hand, unilateral presidential 
withdrawal would be valid as a matter of international law, and the 
NAFTA Implementation Act appears to be designed to terminate in the 
event of a lawful U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA. However, the President 
probably lacks statutory or constitutional authority to withdraw from 
NAFTA, and litigants might overcome political question hurdles by argu-
ing that the NAFTA Implementation Act should not terminate where the 
President’s action exceeds the scope of his authority. Finally, because 
the Legislative Branch possesses constitutional authority over foreign 
commerce, Congress would also have several political remedies if it 
wishes to foreclose unilateral executive withdrawal from NAFTA or other 
congressional–executive agreements.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Since his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump has threatened to with-
draw from the North American Free Trade Agreement (the Agreement), or 
NAFTA.1 
See, e.g., Jethro Mullen, Trump: We’ll Probably End Up Killing NAFTA ‘at Some Point,’ CNN 
(Aug. 23, 2017, 3:47 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/22/investing/trump-nafta-termination/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/6EZU-HBQN] (“‘Personally, I don’t think we can make a deal because we have 
been so badly taken advantage of,’ Trump said during a rally in Arizona on Tuesday night. ‘I think we’ll 
end up probably terminating NAFTA at some point.’”); Vicki Needham, Trump Again Threatens 
Termination of NAFTA in Meeting with Trudeau, HILL (Oct. 11, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://thehill.com/ 
policy/finance/355002-trump-again-threatens-termination-of-nafta-in-meeting-with-trudeau [https:// 
perma.cc/9QW9-NYSY]; Vicki Needham, Trump Says He Will Renegotiate or Withdraw from NAFTA, 
HILL (June 28, 2016, 2:53 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/285189-trump-says-he-will- 
renegotiate-or-withdraw-from-nafta-without-changes [https://perma.cc/82N9-JX7J]. 
Can he? Whether the President can unilaterally withdraw from a con-
gressional–executive trade agreement like NAFTA is predicated on five distinct 
questions. First, can a notice from the President, acting alone, effect U.S. with-
drawal as a matter of international law? Second, do the statutes that created the 
“fast track” procedure for making trade agreements like NAFTA afford the 
President such authority? Third, if such authority is not expressly granted by stat-
ute, would unilateral withdrawal by the President be constitutionally valid? 
Fourth, would U.S. withdrawal from the Agreement disable the statute that imple-
mented the underlying trade obligations into U.S. law—in this case, the NAFTA  
1. 
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Implementation Act?2 And finally, even if the President lacks such authority, is 
there anything anyone can do to stop him? 
These questions are interrelated, and this Article endeavors to answer them all. 
As described in Part I, the answer to the first question—can the President give 
notice of withdrawal under international law?—is a simple “yes.” But functional 
withdrawal and termination of statutory commitments depend on the second and 
third questions: whether the President has the power to unilaterally withdraw the 
United States from NAFTA under the statutes that outline the congressional– 
executive agreement process or, independently, under the Constitution. Parts II 
and III take up the statutory and constitutional analysis required by these ques-
tions, respectively, and conclude that he does not. 
That conclusion invites an exploration of remedies. As discussed in Part IV, 
the NAFTA Implementation Act appears to be designed to self-destruct upon 
lawful U.S. withdrawal—but termination might not occur if presidential with-
drawal exceeds the scope of his constitutional and statutory authority. This argu-
ment may be a more potent way to oppose unilateral presidential action than a 
direct constitutional challenge—Part V concludes that private litigants face sig-
nificant, though perhaps not insurmountable, justiciability hurdles in a constitu-
tional challenge. Congress also has several available mechanisms to challenge 
unilateral presidential withdrawal, but the political will to exercise them may 
falter. 
At the outset, let us recall one critical fact that will guide this analysis: NAFTA 
is not a treaty. Treaty formation is expressly governed by the Treaty Clause of 
Article II of the Constitution, which provides that the President may make an 
agreement with the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified by a two-thirds ma-
jority of that body.3 Although the Constitution’s silence on the process for with-
drawing from treaties has caused its own complications,4 at least it may be argued 
that Article II provides the starting point for answering those questions.5 But the 
Constitution does not expressly contemplate congressional–executive agreements 
at all. Congressional–executive agreements arose during the twentieth century— 
it is not clear when or how.6 In the trade context, the practice was articulated and 
regulated by the Trade Act of 1974, which created a procedure for entry into 
international trade agreements that differed in important respects from treaty 
2. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-82, 107 Stat. 2057 
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation 
Act]. 
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
4. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (declining to consider the constitutionality of 
unilateral presidential termination of the Sino–American Mutual Defense Treaty). 
5. Scholarly debate over the power to terminate treaties has proceeded from that point. See, e.g., 
Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 779 (2014); 
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 
249, 252 (2013). 
6. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995), 
for an overview of the emergence of congressional–executive agreements and the historical debate over 
their constitutionality. 
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formation under Article II.7 Although federal courts have declined to decide 
whether congressional–executive agreements are constitutional,8 the practice has 
continued as an exercise between Congress and the President for decades at least, 
and now appears to be an accepted fact of constitutional life. 
Scholars have long debated the constitutionality of entering into congressional– 
executive agreements,9 but little scholarly attention has been paid to the proper con-
stitutional procedure for withdrawing from them.10 
7. See infra Section II.A. 
8. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (declining on 
political question grounds to decide constitutionality of entry into NAFTA). 
9. E.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: 
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995); 
John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International 
Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (“Ever since their accelerated use began, congressional– 
executive agreements have encountered serious challenges to their legitimacy.”); John C. Yoo, Laws as 
Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001). 
10. A few have made forays into the arena. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, 
Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1336 
(2008) (“[T]he President is on the whole likely to find it more difficult to withdraw unilaterally from a 
congressional–executive agreement than an Article II treaty.”); Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty 
Power, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089, 1115 (1990) (arguing that termination of congressional–executive 
agreements requires participation of Congress). The question has begun to generate more attention 
recently in light of the Trump Administration’s stated policies. See, e.g., BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R44630, U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
LEGAL QUESTIONS 8–10 (2016) (suggesting that the President may have constitutional authority to 
terminate free trade agreements unilaterally); Joel P. Trachtman, Power to Terminate U.S. Trade 
Agreements: The Presidential Dormant Commerce Clause Versus an Historical Gloss Half Empy 1 
(Oct. 20, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3015981 [https://perma.cc/64BP-35F7] (arguing that the President lacks constitutional authority to 
withdraw from NAFTA unilaterally); Zeeshan Aleem, We Asked 6 Experts if Congress Could Stop 
Trump from Eliminating NAFTA, VOX (Oct. 26, 2017, 1:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and- 
politics/2017/10/26/16505508/nafta-congress-block-trump-withdraw-trade-power [https://perma.cc/ 
PK33-NYEM] (presenting a range of expert opinions about the scope of presidential termination 
authority); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Opinion, Trump Might Be Stuck with NAFTA, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 
2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-yoo-ku-trump-nafta-20161129-story. 
html [https//perma.cc/P9KC-6B9X] (arguing that domestic implementation of legal obligations under 
NAFTA would survive presidential withdrawal from agreement). 
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And the statutes that set up the 
process for congressional–executive agreements contain detailed instructions for 
how the President and Congress must exercise their constitutional authority in enter-
ing into those agreements, but lack instruction about what each Branch may or must 
do to effect withdrawal or termination. If the statutes are unclear about who may 
effect withdrawal, is the Executive empowered to fill the gaps? Is there a boundary 
between executive authority over foreign affairs and legislative authority to regulate 
foreign commerce that should be preserved when the United States withdraws from 
trade agreements? 
The President’s power to unilaterally withdraw from congressional–executive 
agreements has important implications for the renegotiation of NAFTA, as well 
as other trade agreements in an era of growing protectionism. President Trump’s  
threat of withdrawal has been used as a bargaining tool in NAFTA negotiations,11 
Joshua Partlow, Mexico Shrugs Off Trump Threats to Scrap NAFTA, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/23/mexico-shrugs-off-trump-threats-to-scrap- 
nafta/?utm_term=.c9819378bb09 [https://perma.cc/2JE2-MT75]; Ira Shapiro, NAFTA Withdrawal 
Looks Likely as Trump Moves Forward with Agenda, HILL (Nov. 16, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://thehill. 
com/opinion/international/360682-nafta-withdrawal-looks-more-likely-as-trump-moves-his-own-agenda 
[https:perma.cc/T2L7-Y7L7]; Josh Wingrove et al., Trump’s ‘Poison Pill’ NAFTA Proposals 
Threaten to Derail Talks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-10-11/u-s-partners-ponder-life-after-nafta-as-talks-hail-chapter-deal [https://perma.cc/ 
4VW2-TF37]. 
and international perception of the legality of unilateral executive action will 
bear on the weight of that threat in these and any future trade agreement rene- 
gotiations. If congressional approval is required, that threat is less forceful. The 
present Republican-controlled Senate may be torn between following their party’s 
President and pleasing their Republican constituencies, which have traditionally 
supported free trade. And politics of congressional approval are made even more 
complicated with the Democrats’ win of the House in 2018.12 
See, e.g., Clare Foran & Daniella Diaz, Democrats Win Control of the House in 2018 Midterms, 
CNN Projects, CNN (Nov. 7, 2018, 2:43 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/06/politics/house-control- 
midterm-election/index.html [https://perma.cc/7DEJ-AX4B]. 
Although the party 
has traditionally opposed free trade agreements, Democrats in Congress have no 
fondness for the current President, either. Serious scholarly (and legislative) atten-
tion to the question of legal authority to withdraw from congressional–executive 
agreements is now imperative and overdue. 
I. CAN THE PRESIDENT EFFECT WITHDRAWAL AS A MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
The first of our five questions is also the easiest. From an international law per-
spective, effecting withdrawal from NAFTA is (not to be too technical) no big 
deal. Article 2205 of the Agreement says, in its entirety, “A Party may withdraw 
from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to 
the other Parties. If a Party withdraws, the Agreement shall remain in force for 
the remaining Parties.”13 One party sends notice to the other two that it intends to 
withdraw, and six months later, it’s done. 
Under international law, Mexico and Canada are entitled—or perhaps obligated— 
to treat notice by the head of state as authoritative. The Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that “[a] state is not required to 
accord formal recognition to the government of another state, but is required to treat 
as the government of another state a regime that is in effective control of that 
state.”14 That’s getting out of NAFTA, free.   
11. 
12. 
13. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Can.–Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
14. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203(1) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1986); see also United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) 
(stating that in foreign relations, “the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative 
of the nation”). 
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II. DO THE TRADE STATUTES GIVE THE PRESIDENT UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL 
POWER? 
The question of which Branch possesses the power to withdraw from 
congressional–executive agreements has significance for both NAFTA renego-
tiations and future U.S. trade relations. It is curious, then, that so little attention 
has been paid to the question by either scholars or Congress when it crafted the 
statutes that set out congressional–executive agreement procedures governing 
trade deals. Those statutes include those that established the congressional– 
executive agreement or “fast track” procedures,15 
See generally, e.g., DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 102 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing “Fast Track Procedure” in trade 
agreements); Lael Brainard & Hal Shapiro, Fast Track Trade Promotion Authority, 91 BROOKINGS INST. 
1 (2001), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb91.pdf (same); Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Fast Track to Nowhere, ECONOMIST (Oct. 16, 1997), http://www.economist.com/node/102730 [https:// 
perma.cc/BXK3-8MDD] (same). 
the Trade Act of 1974,16 and 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.17 They also include stat-
utes that extended the President’s fast track authority, most recently the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015. 
This Part examines a number of trade statutes to see how Congress understood 
the scope of its own power and the Executive’s power to withdraw from trade 
agreements, and what, if any, termination or withdrawal powers it delegated to 
the Executive. After some historical background in section II.A., section II.B. 
searches the Trade Act of 1974 for clues about withdrawal and termination 
authority. Section II.C does the same for the next significant update of fast track 
authority, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Section II.D. 
looks at Congress’s most recent legislation extending fast track authority. 
A. WHY THE NEED FOR THE TRADE ACT OF 1974? 
The Trade Act of 1974 sets up the fast track framework under which 
congressional–executive agreements like NAFTA were negotiated. Unlike trea-
ties, the congressional–executive agreements authorized by the Trade Act are not 
submitted by the President for ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. Instead, the 
Trade Act authorizes the President, for a specific number of years, to negotiate 
trade agreements consistent with priorities identified by Congress in the authoriz-
ing act.18 The Trade Act requires that the President obtain advice on negotiations  
15. 
16. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 
(2012)). 
17. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified 
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901–3111 (2012)). 
18. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2114. The President’s authority has been extended several times since 1974. 
See e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144; Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 93-99, 99 Stat. 405 (1985); Trade Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933; Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 
Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320. 
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from a variety of parties19 and brief designated members of Congress during the 
negotiation process.20 Once an agreement has concluded, the President must sub-
mit the agreement and an implementing bill to Congress.21 Congress must con-
sider and vote on the bill within a specified period of time, with limited debate, 
and without amendment.22 
This procedure was a change from how trade policy was historically made. As 
discussed more fully in section III.B., from the late eighteenth to the early twenti-
eth centuries, U.S. trade policy was essentially synonymous with tariff policy: 
Congress set tariffs on imports as the nation’s primary source of revenue or 
wielded tariffs to achieve access to desired markets, and that was pretty much 
it.23 Trade policy, then, was essentially a congressional power.24 In practice, how-
ever, the President’s power to raise or lower tariffs as a carrot or stick to trade 
partners typically involved some degree of negotiation with the foreign govern-
ments.25 By 1890, Congress began to give the President some limited power to al-
ter congressionally mandated tariff levels by proclamation.26 By 1934, President 
Roosevelt convinced Congress to grant the Executive broader authority to negoti-
ate tariff levels with foreign nations through the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act 
(RTAA).27 That authority was used to enter into a number of bilateral trade agree-
ments, as well as the 1947 multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).28 
By 1973, however, the tariff-making authority bestowed on the President by 
the RTAA was insufficient for modern trade agreements. By the Tokyo Round of 
trade negotiations under GATT, the focus of the parties had shifted from lowering 
tariffs to eliminating nontariff barriers, such as quotas, product specifications, 
labeling requirements, and discriminatory administrative burdens.29 To give the 
President the authority to negotiate elimination of non-tariff barriers, something 
more than traditional “tariff proclamation” authority was needed.30 
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2151–2155. 
20. Id. § 2211(b). 
21. Id. § 2191(c)(1). 
22. Id. § 2191(d)–(g). 
23. See Douglas A. Irwin, Revenue or Reciprocity? Founding Feuds over Early U.S. Trade Policy, in 
FOUNDING CHOICES: AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S, at 89–90 (Douglas A. Irwin & Richard 
Sylla eds., 2010). 
24. See id. at 89; see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994) 
(“That the Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation practice, but encountered an 
unreceptive Congress, is not evidence that the practice interfered with the Nation’s ability to speak with 
one voice, but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to yield the floor to others.”); infra 
Section III.B. 
25. See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
26. For a discussion of the history of reciprocity provisions in the tariff acts, see infra Section III.B. 
27. See Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934); see infra notes 
180–97 and accompanying text. 
28. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A–11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
29. See The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.–Israel FTA, U.S.– 
Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy 18–22, Inv. No. TA-2111-1, 
USITC Pub. 3621 (Aug. 2003) (Final). 
30. Id. at 14 & n.4. 
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Congress immediately recognized a constitutional dilemma. As described in a 
retrospective report of the International Trade Commission, Congress was faced 
with the task of expanding the President’s authority in a way sufficiently broad to 
negotiate non-tariff barriers, but which did not “abrogate Congress’s constitu-
tional powers over international trade or ignore those barriers’ impact on the peo-
ple of the United States.”31 
Congress fashioned a solution in the Trade Act of 1974.32 Under that statute, 
Congress authorized the President, for a specific period of time, to negotiate trade 
agreements extending beyond tariff proclamations to include non-tariff barriers 
and other issues, such as subsidies. To ensure that the negotiations expressed the 
will of the people of the United States, the President was obligated to consult 
with a number of specific congressional committees,33 as well as other executive 
agencies and public and private bodies, during the negotiation process.34 To pro-
vide assurances to foreign governments that costly negotiating efforts would not 
be thwarted by a recalcitrant Congress, the Trade Act of 1974 provided that 
agreements would be subject to approval by Congress without amendment.35 
This was not the treaty process that frustrated the world and embarrassed the 
President when the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles;36 trade agree-
ments would be approved, not by a two-thirds majority of the Senate, but by a 
simple majority of both houses after limited debate.37 
The committee reports and remarks from the floor during Congress’s consider-
ation of the Trade Act of 1974 reveal that Congress viewed the trade agreement 
power to be its own, and that the expansion of executive power to make trade 
deals was an express—and limited—delegation of legislative power to the 
President. For example, in the report of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means transmitting the bill to the full House for consideration, the committee 
described the bill as expanding presidential authority over non-tariff trade bar-
riers, unfair trade practices, trade with state trading countries like the Soviet 
Union, and trade preferences for developing countries.38 In light of this expan-
sion, the committee immediately addressed separation-of-powers questions. Its 
solution was an express delegation of congressional authority to the President, 
with Congress still holding the reins: 
[I]t is important to stress that the achievement of these objectives entails a sub-
stantial delegation of congressional authority. Accordingly, the bill makes cer-
tain procedural reforms, both in terms of the development of an appropriate 
31. Id. at 14 & n.6 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 75–76 (1974)). 
32. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 
(2012)). 
33. Id. § 2211. 
34. Id. §§ 2151–2155. 
35. Id. § 2191(f)(1), (g)(1). 
36. See Hathaway, supra note 10, at 1299. 
37. See 19 U.S.C. § 2191. 
38. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 1–5 (1973). 
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oversight role for the Congress and in terms of providing a focal point in the 
executive branch for carrying out the trade policies jointly agreed upon by the 
Congress and the President.39 
In the floor debates, individual members of Congress also emphasized that the 
President’s new authority came from a delegation of legislative power, and that 
the bill was crafted to ensure constitutional congressional oversight of the use of 
that power. Representative Ullman, speaking in favor of the bill, assured the 
members that the bill did not give unfettered power to the President: “In this bill 
the trade agreement authority is delegated to the President under stricter statutory 
guidelines and more specific limitations than ever before.”40 He emphasized the 
bill’s “[g]uidelines, limitations, requirements of investigations and public hear-
ings, consultations, disapproval procedures” in support of his argument that “the 
delegation of authority in this bill is not an unlimited grant.”41 In this way, 
Representative Ullman said, the bill “preserves the constitutional power of the 
Congress, and it gives the executive branch strong backing in the forthcoming 
negotiations” in the Tokyo Round of the GATT.42 
Reflecting the Cold War environment of the era, the Jackson–Vanik 
Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 allowed the President by proclamation to 
either extend or withdraw nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of Soviet 
Bloc countries.43 Testimony from the floor supports the notion that Congress saw 
the power given to the President under the Jackson–Vanik Amendment as a dele-
gation of congressional authority over foreign commerce. Senator Roth testified 
that he had an amendment to the amendment drafted that would have allowed 
Congress, as well as the President, to withdraw or suspend nondiscriminatory 
treatment to the products of Soviet bloc countries.44 In describing his amendment, 
Senator Roth said, “This new congressional authority is in accord with the consti-
tutional provision giving Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations.”45 Ultimately, he decided not to offer the amendment, fearing that it 
would be “too rigorous” and “might jeopardize the assurances that have already 
been given.”46 Senator Roth’s withdrawal apparently did not reflect any misgiv-
ings about the source of the constitutional authority because he urged that the 
amendment “should be kept in mind in case Congress wishes to adopt it later.”47 
39. Id. at 3–4. 
40. 119 CONG. REC. 40,500, 40,501–02 (1973). 
41. Id. at 40,502. 
42. Id. 
43. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431, 2434(a), (c) (2012). For discussion of the Jackson–Vanik Amendments as a 
reflection of U.S. policy toward Soviet Bloc countries, see generally Robert H. Bradner, The Jackson- 
Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974: Soviet Progress on Emigration Reform is Insufficient to 
Merit a Waiver, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 639 (1990); Michael S. McMahon, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
to the Trade Act of 1974: An Assessment After Five Years, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 525 (1979). 
44. 120 CONG. REC. 39,801 (1974). 
45. Id. at 33,424. 
46. Id. at 39,801. 
47. Id. 
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B. WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION AUTHORITY IN THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 
This was the historical and constitutional context in which the Trade Act of 
1974 was passed. What attention did Congress devote to the question of with-
drawal and termination? The Trade Act contains one provision devoted to 
“Termination and Withdrawal Authority.”48 Section 125 of the Act contains six 
subsections, each a sentence or two long, and touches on a variety of issues 
related to withdrawal or termination: withdrawal periods, presidential proclama-
tions, unfair trade remedies, effect of withdrawal on tariffs, and transparency.49 
What section 125 does not expressly deal with is who may withdraw from trade 
agreements. The answer to that question can only be determined by reading 
between the lines. Though some aspects of section 125 might superficially be 
construed as supporting unilateral presidential authority to withdraw, the better 
reading of the statute is that Congress did not intend to delegate such broad 
authority to the President. In the context of the trade concerns of 1974, the statu-
tory delegation to the President seems designed to meet more narrowly tailored 
goals and to allow Congress to retain all of its residual authority over the regula-
tion of foreign commerce. 
1. Who May Withdraw? 
Where the Act provides for withdrawal and termination of trade agreements, it 
does not specify who has the power to take such actions. Section 125(a) of the 
statute, which provides for termination of or withdrawal from trade deals entered 
into under the Act, is written in the passive voice—no subject, no actor. Section 
125(a) provides: 
Every trade agreement entered into under this chapter shall be subject to termi-
nation, in whole or in part, or withdrawal, upon due notice, at the end of a pe-
riod specified in the agreement. Such period shall be note more than 3 years 
from the date on which the agreement becomes effective. If the agreement is 
not terminated or withdrawn from at the end of the period so specified, it shall 
be subject to termination or withdrawal thereafter upon not more than 6 
months’ notice.50 
The first sentence of section 125(a) says that any trade deal entered into under 
the Act shall be “subject to” termination or withdrawal, but is silent on whose 
action such withdrawal or termination would be “subject to.” The last sentence 
says that an agreement may be “subject to” withdrawal or termination upon six 
months’ notice if it is “not terminated or withdrawn from” during the specified 
period.51 
48. 19 U.S.C. § 2135. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. § 2135(a). 
51. Id. 
2019] WITHDRAWING FROM NAFTA 657 
Did Congress intend the President to effectuate U.S. withdrawal? Such author-
ity is far from obvious in the statutory scheme because section 125(c) sets out a 
distinction between actions of “the United States” and actions of “the President:” 
Whenever the United States, acting in pursuance of any of its rights or obliga-
tions under any trade agreement . . . withdraws, suspends, or modifies any obli-
gation with respect to the trade of any foreign country or instrumentality 
thereof, the President is authorized to proclaim increased duties or other 
import restrictions, to the extent, at such times, and for such periods as he 
deems necessary or appropriate, in order to exercise the rights or fulfill the 
obligations of the United States.52 
The statute is ambiguous as to how—by what Branches, in what roles—“the 
United States” is expected to exercise its withdrawal authority. The distinction 
between action by the United States and action by the President suggests that 
Congress contemplated action of “the United States” to mean something other 
than unilateral presidential power. 
Nor does section 125(e), the other subsection that expressly discusses the event 
of termination or withdrawal, assign that power to any actor. That subsection sets 
up a default rule that U.S. tariff levels, for one year, “shall not be affected by any 
termination, in whole or in part, of such agreement or by the withdrawal of the 
United States from such agreement.”53 In the next sentence, Congress expressly 
authorizes certain presidential powers over tariffs in the event of withdrawal, but 
those powers do not include a general power to withdraw from or terminate an 
agreement.54 
Section 125(e), codified at id., permits the President to override the default rule and return tariffs 
to their pre-agreement levels for one year; it requires the President to submit recommendations as to the 
appropriate rate of duty within sixty days of termination or withdrawal. Id. This requirement to submit 
recommendations seems to be independent of whether the President proclaims a return to pre-agreement 
tariff levels: he is required to deliver his recommendation about appropriate rates of duty as to articles 
for which the President has ordered rates to be returned to pre-agreement levels and also as to articles for 
which rates remain unaltered by the President. See id. This does not seem to allow the President the 
broad leeway “to decide how much to involve Congress in setting new commercial terms for trade with 
Mexico and Canada” that Gary Clyde Hufbauer ascribes. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Can Trump 
Terminate NAFTA?, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Oct. 10, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/ 
trade-investment-policy-watch/can-trump-terminate-nafta [https://perma.cc/7BTC-HL7B]. 
Indeed, the Trade Act prescribes numerous express presidential 
powers, but never expressly authorizes the President to withdraw from trade 
agreements.55 This omission of any such express authority when the Act dis-
cusses withdrawal and termination from trade agreements is conspicuous. 
52. Id. § 2135(c) (emphasis added). 
53. Id. § 2135(e). 
54. 
55. See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (permitting the President to terminate proclamations made under the 
Act); id. § 2132(a)–(c) (permitting the President to proclaim temporary import surcharges and 
limitations on imports); id. § 2115 (permitting the President the discretion to determine whether bilateral 
agreements would better benefit the economic interests of the United States). 
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2. Presidential Proclamations Versus Withdrawing from Trade Agreements 
Section 125(b) provides the President the authority to “at any time terminate, 
in whole or in part, any proclamation made under this chapter.”56 Although this 
authority is broad, the history of trade negotiation suggests that this is not a gen-
eral power to withdraw from trade agreements as a whole. 
Historically, the President’s power to make proclamations under tariff acts 
referred to his power to raise or lower duties within certain limits and under 
certain conditions, against the backdrop of a detailed tariff law passed by 
Congress.57 In debates on the Trade Act of 1974, members of Congress 
described section 125(b) as an uncontroversial continuation of authority that 
had been delegated to the President under all trade legislation since the 
RTAA.58 Although it gave the President an unprecedented number of tools to 
negotiate reciprocal duties and concessions, it did not alter the primary consti-
tutional allocation of tariff-making that had existed since the Founding: 
Congress set duties and imposts through tariff laws, and the President was 
authorized only to raise or lower tariffs (and sometimes other import restric-
tions) to obtain trade concessions or to punish discrimination against U.S. 
products.59 
By 1974, the Trade Act was designed to accomplish something different. 
Acknowledging that the old congressional tariff laws were a thing of the 
past in trade negotiations, it gave the President a priori power to negotiate 
trade deals that dealt primarily with regulatory burdens to trade rather than 
with tariffs, subject to consultation, advice, review, and approval by 
Congress.60 
This distinction between “trade agreements” and “proclamations” is reflected 
in the structure of the 1974 Act. Section 101(a), which sets out the basic authority 
for entering into trade agreements, divides the President’s authority between two 
tools: (1) entering into trade agreements and (2) proclaiming tariff modifications. 
Section 101(a) provides: 
Whenever the President determines that any existing duties or other import 
restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening 
and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purposes of 
this chapter will be promoted thereby, the President— 
(1) . . . may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries or instrumental-
ities thereof, and 
56. Id. § 2135(b). 
57. See infra Section III.B. 
58. See 119 CONG. REC. 40,507 (statement of Rep. Ullman) (“This authority has existed in all prior 
acts since 1934.”). 
59. See infra Section III.B. 
60. See supra notes 18–47 and accompanying text. 
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(2)  may proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty . . . as 
he determines to be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade 
agreement.61 
This distinction between “trade agreements” and the proclamations “required 
or appropriate to carry [them] out” carries throughout other sections of Title I of 
the Trade Act.62 Terminating a proclamation—as provided in section 125(b)—is 
not the same as terminating or withdrawing from a trade agreement. 
Two other subsections authorize the President to raise duties in the exercise of 
U.S. renegotiation rights under its trade agreements (section 125(c))63 or in retali-
ation for suspension of trade concessions by another country without adequate 
compensation (section 125(d)).64 These mechanisms—essentially early dispute 
resolution remedies and renegotiation mechanisms under the pre-World Trade 
Organization (WTO) GATT—do not appear to represent a wholesale power to 
withdraw from trade agreements. 
3. Transparency and Public Participation Requirements 
A dark-of-night withdrawal from NAFTA by the President would also violate 
section 125(f), which requires public participation in any presidential decision 
taken under section 125. Section 125(f) provides: “[b]efore taking any action pur-
suant to subsection (b), (c), or (d) of this section, the President shall provide for a 
public hearing during the course of which interested persons shall be given a rea-
sonable opportunity to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard,” except 
where urgent action is needed.65 Even in cases requiring expediency, the statute 
requires a prompt hearing.66 Although “interested persons” is not defined in the 
statute, it is possible that members of Congress could claim the right to appear 
and be heard. 
At minimum, any presidential action—even a proclamation to raise or lower 
duties, which the President has been authorized to do since 1934—must be done 
according to specific procedures under section 125(f). Because Congress required 
public participation and transparency before the President may take even familiar 
61. 19 U.S.C. § 2111(a). 
62. See id. § 2133(a) (dividing President’s authority to compensate trade partners for U.S. trade 
actions between entering trade agreements and proclaiming modification or continuance of duties); id. § 
2134 (dividing President’s authority for two-year period following expiration of statutory period 
between entering trade agreements and proclaiming modification or continuance of duties). 
63. Id. § 2135(c); see S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 91 (1974) (negotiations and suspensions contemplated 
in section 125(c) “now occur mainly where the GATT rules allow a country the right to withdraw or 
suspend tariff concessions owed to other contracting parties to the Agreement”); see also S. COMM. ON 
FINANCE, 93RD CONG., SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF H.R. 10710—THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, 21 
(Comm. Print 1974) (analyzing identical language in earlier version of bill and concluding that “[t]he 
withdrawal authority provided under paragraph (c) is intended to give the United States leverage to 
persuade contracting parties to the GATT to modify or eliminate practices which the United States felt 
violated our rights under this agreement”). 
64. 19 U.S.C. § 2135(d). 
65. Id. § 2135(f). 
66. Id. 
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actions, it seems unlikely that Congress intended, without explicit authorization 
or discussion, to give the President plenary authority to withdraw the United 
States from trade agreements without consultation. 
C. UPDATING PRESIDENTIAL TRADE AUTHORITY: THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND 
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 
The Trade Act of 1974 gave the President the necessary authority to negoti-
ate for the United States in the Tokyo Round of the GATT in 1979, which 
focused more on non-tariff barriers to trade than on the more traditional sub-
jects of tariffs and quantitative import restrictions. In the 1980s, as the United 
States accumulated unprecedented trade deficits, Congress responded with the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Act).67 The 1988 Act, 
according to one commentator, “tinkered at the margins rather than making 
fundamental changes.”68 
The liberal trade policy that had been gaining ascendancy since 1934, with the 
President at the forefront of negotiations, was maintained in the 1988 Act. The 
Senate Report on the bill noted that, “[f]or more than 50 years, the President’s 
authority to negotiate trade agreements has been recognized as the cornerstone of 
an effective trade policy.”69 The Senate claimed an agnostic view of the 
President’s constitutional authority: the Senate Finance Committee justified its 
decision to renew and revitalize the President’s negotiating authority on the 
grounds that, “without some Congressional authority to negotiate, the President 
will be unable to negotiate successfully on trade, whatever his Constitutional pre-
rogatives.”70 This is because other countries know that trade acts must be imple-
mented by Congress: “[t]he President will be a more effective negotiator to 
the extent he can assure foreign governments that he is implementing a 
Congressional directive, since the Congress is more likely to approve action in 
accordance with what it has directed than action it had no part in formulating.”71 
In substance, however, the 1988 Act reveals a Congress that viewed itself 
as holding the power to grant, condition, or deny presidential negotiation 
authority—a position inconsistent with a model of unilateral presidential author-
ity over trade agreements as part of his foreign affairs power. Although it 
renewed the President’s fast track trade authority, the Senate Report noted that 
Congress was “concerned” that observance of the terms of the 1974 Act had 
“deteriorated badly”—concerns that Congress intended to address “firmly” in the 
new law.72 The Report introduced two new mechanisms, both of which are exer-
cises of congressional control over presidential negotiating authority. First, the 
bill contained “provisions designed to assure that consultative mechanisms— 
67. See I.M. Destler, U.S. Trade Policy-Making in the Eighties, in POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE 
EIGHTIES 251, 270–73 (Alberto Alesina & Geoffrey Carliner eds., 1991). 
68. Id. at 252. 
69. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, OMNIBUS TRADE ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 100-71, at 5 (1st Sess. 1987). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
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especially close consultation with the Congress—are given new life.”73 If 
Congress is not satisfied with the Administration’s consultation process, it has the 
authority under the 1988 Act to “revoke the negotiating authority using stream-
lined legislative procedures.”74 Second, the Senate Committee “provided a vari-
ety of powers intended to give the President leverage in . . . negotiations, 
including the power to switch [from multilateral] to bilateral negotiations”75—a 
power that would not have to be “provided” by Congress if Congress believed it 
were inherent in the President’s foreign affairs powers. 
This presumption of legislative control is reflected in the 1988 Act’s termina-
tion provision, section 1105. Section 1105(a) incorporates the termination-and- 
withdrawal provision of the 1974 Act by declaring that an agreement entered into 
under the 1988 Act shall be treated as if it were entered into under the 1974 Act.76 
Section 1105(b) also contains a new termination provision that reflected the driv-
ing concern of the era, negative trade balance with “major industrial countries,” 
which includes Canada, the European Communities (EC), EC member states, 
Japan, or any other country designated by the President.77 Under that provision, 
the President is authorized to determine whether any of the major industrial coun-
tries has denied U.S. commerce “substantially equivalent competitive opportuni-
ties” by denying concessions owed under trade agreements entered into under the 
Act.78 
The remedy, however, is not left to the discretion of the President. If the 
President finds such a denial of “[r]eciprocal [n]ondiscriminatory [t]reatment,” 
the Act requires the President to recommend that Congress take action to termi-
nate.79 The terminating actions that the President is to recommend to Congress 
here are sweeping, effectively ending a U.S. trade agreement with the country in 
question: Section 1105(b)(2)(A) is a presidential recommendation that Congress 
pass legislation terminating or denying benefits of trade concessions entered into 
under the Act.80 Under the Act, such legislation may include agreements about 
duties and other import restrictions as well as agreements about non-tariff barriers 
to trade.81 Section 1105(b)(2)(B) is a presidential recommendation that Congress 
73. Id. at 6. 
74. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(1)(E) (2012) (providing that fast track procedures shall not 
apply if both chambers agree that the “President has failed or refused to consult with Congress on trade 
negotiations and trade agreements”); id. § 2903(c)(2) (providing that fast track procedures shall apply 
where president has failed to consult with and provide sixty-days notice to the Senate Finance 
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee or those Committees disapprove of negotiations 
within sixty days). 
75. S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 6 (1987). 
76. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1105(a) 102 Stat. 
1107, 1132–33 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2904(a) (2012)). 
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2904(b)(3). 
78. Id. § 2904(b)(1). 
79. Id. § 2904(b)(2). 
80. Id. § 2904(b)(2)(A). 
81. Id. § 2904(a) (authorizing President to negotiate trade agreements regarding tariff barriers and to 
proclaim modification or continuance of duties or excise treatments); id. § 2904(b) (authorizing 
President to enter into agreements regarding non-tariff barriers). 
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pass “legislation providing that any law necessary to carry out any trade agree-
ment under [the 1988 Act] not apply to such country.”82 This is to be regular 
legislation; the Act contains no provisions providing special procedures for con-
sideration or passage of such legislation recommended by the President. 
In this special case of discriminatory treatment by its trading partners in the 
1980s, Congress provided for a bilateral termination process: the President would 
make findings of imbalance in “competitive opportunities” and recommend ter-
mination to Congress, but Congress would retain the power (which it must have 
believed it possessed in the first place) to terminate both trade concessions and 
implementing legislation through ordinary legislation.83 
D. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL IN THE BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL TRADE PRIORITIES 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2015 
Similarly, the 2015 iteration of fast track authority under which the NAFTA 
renegotiations are proceeding is silent about withdrawal and termination author-
ity, and thus provides no direct guidance on the question.84 The Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 does, however, 
support the general principle of congressional control and oversight over trade 
agreements. Similar to the 1988 Act, the 2015 Act provides that the fast track 
implementing procedures in Congress will not apply where the President has not 
complied with detailed notification and consultation provisions to Congress and 
other parties as described in the Act.85 Section 104 of the Act outlines five pages 
of requirements for “Congressional Oversight, Consultations, and Access to 
Information.”86 Section 105 contains another eight pages of notice, consultation, 
and reporting requirements to Congress as a whole and to specific congressional 
committees before, during, and after negotiations.87 
III. DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW FROM 
TRADE AGREEMENTS? 
So far, the answers to our first two questions tell us that (1) the President has 
the power to deliver a notice of withdrawal that Mexico and Canada would likely 
recognize, but (2) Congress did not make any clear delegation of authority to the 
President to withdraw from trade agreements formed under the fast track proce-
dure. That brings us to our third question: even lacking clear congressional au-
thorization, does the President nevertheless have the inherent constitutional 
82. Id. § 2904(b)(2)(B). 
83. Id. § 2904(b). 
84. See generally Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-26, tit. I, 129 Stat. 320 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4210 (Supp. IV 2016)) 
(passed as part of the Defending Public Safety Employees’ Retirement Act). The issue is of only 
prospective interest, because termination of the existing NAFTA would be governed by the 1974 and 
1988 Acts under which it was negotiated and implemented. 
85. 19 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1). 
86. Id. § 4203. The number of pages refers to pagination in the public law within section 104 of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
87. Id. § 4204. 
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authority to legally effect withdrawal of the country from international 
agreements? 
This question requires inquiry into the intersection between two separate sour-
ces of constitutional authority. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, Congress has 
the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”88 At the same time, 
Article II gives the President several express powers relating to foreign affairs.89 
To understand the relative constitutional powers of these two Branches over trade 
agreements, this Part considers the law describing those Article I and Article II 
powers and the history of U.S. withdrawal from trade agreements. From the law, 
we can glean the outlines of the constitutional division of power between the 
Legislative and Executive Branches. From the history, we can gain an empirical 
understanding of how Congress and the President have traditionally understood 
that division, based on what they have actually done. 
A. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 
POWERS 
Traditionally, and particularly in the middle of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the President’s authority over foreign affairs expan-
sively, in sweeping rhetoric that was invoked by the Executive to justify nearly 
unfettered control over any decisions touching on foreign policy. In more recent 
cases, however, the Court has curtailed the President’s foreign affairs authority, 
demonstrating a more careful balancing of the foreign affairs power of the 
President and the foreign commerce power of Congress.90 These more recent 
cases help to demonstrate the limits of the Executive’s broad, but not plenary, 
authority over matters that touch on foreign affairs. 
1. The Limits of the “Sole Organ” Doctrine 
The Court’s most sweeping statement about the breadth of the Executive’s for-
eign affairs power was in United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export Corp. There, 
the Court famously proclaimed that “[i]n this vast external realm, with its 
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
89. The Supreme Court has found the President’s authority as the sole “voice” of the United States 
to be located in the Commander-in-Chief powers in id. art. II, § 2; the Treaty Clause in id. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2; and the ambassador powers in id. art. II, § 3. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In our dealings with the outside world, the United States speaks 
with one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by the complications as to domestic issues which are 
inherent in the distribution of political power between the national government and the individual 
states.”); United States. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (finding that “the Executive had 
authority to speak as the sole organ of [the federal] government” when recognizing and settling U.S. 
nationals’ claims against the Soviet government); United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation.”). But see, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign 
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 979 (2001) (“[A]lthough the ‘one-voice’ doctrine has lengthy roots in 
the case law, the Constitution ensures that the national government will speak at least as a trio in the 
foreign relations area.”); David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 955 (2014) 
(arguing that the one-voice doctrine “partially captures constitutional principles” but is to a greater 
extent “inconsistent with constitutional text, structure, and history”). 
90. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015). 
664 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:647 
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has 
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”91 Indeed, the Court 
continued, “[i]nto the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and 
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”92 This is the source of the “sole organ” 
rhetoric, so often quoted by government attorneys that it has become cliche´.93 
The Court derived its “sole organ” language from Representative John 
Marshall’s speech before Congress in 1800.94 Marshall may have drawn his opin-
ion from international law of the time, which required that nations have a single 
“representative authority” to act as its representative with other nations.95 
The Court has supplied a generous amount of rhetoric to support claims by the 
Executive of near-omnipotence over anything related to foreign affairs. The 
Court has cited the President’s “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our 
foreign relations,”96 his “lead role . . . in foreign policy,”97 the “powers conferred 
by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ in 
foreign affairs”98 and even his “authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with 
other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by 
Congress.”99 
However, most of the often-cited cases for the “sole organ” or “one voice” doc-
trine did not involve conflicts between the political Branches at all. In Curtiss– 
Wright, the respondent challenged an indictment issued pursuant to a presidential 
proclamation against arms sales to Bolivia.100 There was no dispute that the 
President’s proclamation was expressly authorized by a Joint Resolution from 
Congress; respondents’ challenge was based on the nondelegation doctrine that 
prohibits Congress from delegating the lawmaking power to any other Branch.101 
Numerous other cases focused on the power of the President—representative of 
the federal government—to preempt state action.102 
91. 299 U.S. at 319. 
92. Id. 
93. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990) (“Among 
government attorneys, Justice Sutherland’s lavish description of the president’s powers is so often 
quoted that it has come to be known as the ‘“Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right” cite’ . . . .”). 
94. Curtiss–Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. 
Marshall)). 
95. See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 
987, 1012–13, 1013 & n.61 (2013) (citing QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 15 (1922)). 
96. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
97. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
98. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948). 
99. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003). 
100. Curtiss–Wright, 299 U.S. at 311–13. 
101. Id. at 314–15; see also Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 73, 75 (1993) 
(holding Tennessee shipping container tax not preempted by federal shipping taxation scheme nor 
opposed by Executive Branch as in prior cases); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 109–10 (refusing 
to review denial of certificate for public air transport route granted by the President pursuant to federal 
statutory scheme). 
102. See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401, 419–20 (finding California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance 
Relief Act preempted as an impermissible interference with the President’s conduct of foreign affairs); 
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Yet where the President’s foreign affairs power brushes up against the foreign 
commerce power, the Court has made clear that its “one voice” rhetoric should 
not be taken as bestowing power carte blanche to the Executive in all matters 
involving foreign affairs. In Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, for example, 
the Court expressly rejected the Executive’s argument that the President “has 
‘exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations,’ along with ‘the bulk of for-
eign-affairs powers.’”103 Instead, the Court emphasized that Congress, as the law-
making branch, also retained a role in foreign affairs: 
In a world that is ever more compressed and interdependent, it is essential the 
congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected. For it is 
Congress that makes laws, and in countless ways its laws will and should shape 
the Nation’s course. The Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and 
checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue. It is not for the 
President alone to determine the whole content of the Nation’s foreign 
policy.104 
Although the Court ultimately decided that the President has exclusive author-
ity to recognize a foreign government, that conclusion was only made after 
detailed analyses of both caselaw and historical practice.105 
Not all cases involving inter-branch conflicts over foreign policy have come 
out in the President’s favor. In Medellin v. Texas, the Court held that the 
President could not unilaterally implement a decision by the International Court 
of Justice that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention, a non-self- 
executing treaty.106 The Court rejected the President’s argument that he was 
“uniquely qualifie[d]” to make the “sensitive foreign policy decisions” involved 
in complying expeditiously with the ICJ decision.107 Instead, the Court held that 
“[t]he responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a 
non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”108 The Court 
found that role to emanate from the Treaty Clause, which gives shared responsi-
bility over treaties to the President and the Senate.109 Moreover, the Court rea-
soned that Congress’s share in this authority was constitutionally unremarkable: 
“It should not be surprising that our Constitution does not contemplate vesting 
such power in the Executive alone. As Madison explained in The Federalist No. 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375, 380–86 (2000) (finding Massachusetts law 
prohibiting trade with Burma preempted by federal statutory scheme affording discretion to President to 
make policy); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1976) (neutral ad valorem state 
taxes not within Import–Export Clause prohibition on tariffs by states); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 
419, 424–25 (1827) (interpreting Import–Export and Foreign Commerce Clauses to prohibit 
discriminatory taxation by states after importation of taxed items). 
103. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015) (quoting the Secretary of State’s brief). 
104. Id. at 2090 (citations omitted). 
105. See id. at 2083–94. 
106. 552 U.S. 491, 497–99 (2008). 
107. Id. at 523–24 (quoting the government’s brief). 
108. Id. at 525–26. 
109. See id. at 526. 
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47, under our constitutional system of checks and balances, ‘[t]he magistrate in 
whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law.’”110 
Maintaining a role for Congress in the withdrawal from congressional–executive 
trade agreements should be similarly unsurprising, because trade deals histori-
cally were as much a function of Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause author-
ity as of the President’s foreign affairs authority. In Barclays Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Board, the Court recognized that “[t]he Constitution expressly 
grants Congress, not the President, the power to ‘regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations.’”111 The Court relied on this principle to disregard as irrelevant the 
Executive’s disapproval of California’s method of taxing multinational corpora-
tions, despite the potential foreign policy implications of that practice.112 
Congress’s apathy to an executive policy preference, the Court concluded, was 
not evidence that California’s tax interfered with the nation’s ability to speak 
with one voice, but was “rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to 
yield the floor to others.”113 
The Court has recognized that Congress’s power over foreign commerce is 
broader than its power over interstate commerce. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of 
Los Angeles, the Supreme Court set aside a California tax on cargo containers 
that were based, registered, and subject to tax in Japan as a violation of 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.114 The Court deter-
mined that although the Domestic Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce 
Clause were stated in parallel phrases in Article I, “there is evidence that the 
Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.”115 
The Court also found support in the Import–Export Clause,116 which provides 
that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts 
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for 
executing it’s inspection Laws.”117 The Court drew from its earlier precedent 
interpreting the Import–Export Clause in the context of a tax on domestic com-
merce.118 In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, the Court held that the Import–Export 
Clause did not prohibit a state ad valorem property tax that was applied in a non-
discriminatory fashion to both goods upon import and imported goods that  
110. Id. at 527–28 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 326 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
111. 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); see also Itel Containers Int’l 
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The President] is better able to 
decide than we are which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our national 
interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make that 
decision, but only Congress.”). 
112. See Barclays Bank, at 328–30. 
113. Id. at 329. 
114. 441 U.S. 434, 451–52 (1979). 
115. Id. at 448. 
116. Id. at 449 n.14. 
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
118. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449 n.14 (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285– 
86 (1976)). 
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are no longer in import transit.119 Relying on this precedent the Court in Japan 
Line extended the “one voice” reasoning to support broad congressional authority 
over foreign commerce, stating that “[t]he need for federal uniformity is no less 
paramount in ascertaining the negative implications of Congress’ power to ‘regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations’ under the Commerce Clause.”120 
2. Applying the Youngstown Framework 
Apart from these broad statements of the scope foreign affairs and foreign 
commerce authority, Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown offers 
a test to delineate the President’s foreign affairs power from Congress’s power 
to regulate foreign commerce.121 Under the tripartite Youngstown framework, 
the President’s authority is greatest when he acts pursuant to express or implied 
congressional authorization, “for it includes all that he possesses in his own 
right plus all that Congress can delegate.”122 Where Congress has been silent 
on the matter, presidential action occurs in a “zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncer-
tain.”123 In these situations, outcomes are likely to be more pragmatic, turning 
on the “imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on 
abstract theories of law.”124 Finally, when the President’s actions are “incom-
patible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest 
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”125 Youngstown’s three cat-
egories are treated below in reverse order of potential applicability to presiden-
tial withdrawal from NAFTA. 
a. First Youngstown Category: Acting According to the Express or Implied Will 
of Congress 
There is room for debate as to how a court would apply this framework to uni-
lateral presidential withdrawal from NAFTA. The first category is probably the 
easiest to eliminate: for all of the reasons discussed in Parts II and IV of this 
Article, the President lacks a strong argument that the fast track statutory frame-
work or the NAFTA Implementation Act give him express or implied authority 
to withdraw from NAFTA without congressional consent. 
119. 423 U.S. at 285–86. 
120. 441 U.S. at 449 n.14 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
121. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson J., 
concurring). Justice Jackson’s concurrence was explicitly adopted by the Court in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62 (1981). The Court has continued to apply this analytical framework in 
subsequent cases. E.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524–25 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 638 (2006). 
122. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
123. Id. at 637. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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b. Third Youngstown Category: Presidential Measure Incompatible with 
Congressional Will 
It is possible that a court would view unilateral presidential withdrawal as fall-
ing within Justice Jackson’s third category—a measure “incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress.”126 Although Congress has not expressly 
spoken on the question of presidential withdrawal, the statutory regime may be 
read fairly to imply a dual-branch mechanism for withdrawal or termination.127 
First, the Trade Act of 1974 and the Omnibus Act of 1988 carefully prescribe the 
cooperative authority of both Branches when entering into trade agreements, 
implying the contemplation of a cooperative exit strategy as well.128 Second, the 
legislative histories of both fast track statutes illustrate that members of Congress 
viewed the constitutional authority for trade agreements to be a fundamentally 
legislative power and consciously withheld any authority not expressly granted to 
the President.129 And finally, as discussed more fully in Part IV, the NAFTA 
Implementation Act incorporates a Statement of Administration Action, in which 
the President makes representations—in the only circumstances where with-
drawal is expressly discussed—to withdraw from NAFTA only after “thorough 
consultation” with Congress.130 
Moreover, the history of presidential use and expansion of trade agreement 
authority demonstrates that presidents, as well as Congress, have always viewed 
the trade agreement authority as a legislative power and, consequently, have peti-
tioned Congress to expand the executive role when additional authority was 
sought.131 This view of the relative constitutional powers of each Branch is sup-
ported by the writings of international law experts from the early days of the 
expansion of presidential trade authority. Writing in 1922, Quincy Wright identi-
fied the President’s authority to make trade agreements as a function of his role as 
head of the Executive with the power to execute the nation’s laws.132 Wright 
stated that the President, “[i]n this capacity, . . . may only make international 
agreements, under authority expressly delegated to him by Congress, or the treaty 
power, or agreements of a nature which he can carry out within the scope of exist-
ing legislation.”133 
Moreover, the Executive cannot fall back on his independent constitutional 
powers where his action would contradict the express or implied will of 
126. Id. 
127. See supra Part II. 
128. See supra notes 48–83 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 38–47, 72–75 and accompanying text. 
130. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION ACT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 7 (1993) 
(approved by Congress in NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-82, § 101(a)(2), 107 Stat. 2057, 
2061(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311(a)(2) (2012)) (providing that the Administration after consultation 
with Congress would cease to apply NAFTA to Canada or Mexico if either country withdrew from the 
labor or environmental side agreements). 
131. See infra Section III.B. 
132. WRIGHT, supra note 95, at 235–36. 
133. Id. at 236. 
2019] WITHDRAWING FROM NAFTA 669 
Congress. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court quickly dismissed the argument that 
the President might rely on his independent powers as Commander-in-Chief to 
ignore limitations placed by Congress on the establishment of procedures for 
military commissions.134 
c. Second Youngstown Category: Presidential Action and Congressional 
Silence 
Finally, a court may view the statutory framework as merely silent on the ques-
tion of withdrawal power, in which case Justice Jackson’s second category would 
come into play. In this category, the President’s foreign affairs power might be 
seen as competing with Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce. In 
recent cases, the Court has narrowed, and possibly eliminated, presidential 
authority in Justice Jackson’s zone of twilight.135 In Medellin v. Texas, the 
President argued that his memorandum requiring state courts to comply with a 
decision of the International Court of Justice was justified under the President’s 
independent foreign affairs powers, though Congress had not spoken on the ques-
tion at issue.136 Applying Jackson’s Youngstown framework, the Court first noted 
that only Congress, not the President, had the authority to implement non-self- 
executing treaties.137 Next, the Court rejected the argument that the President 
might rely on his foreign affairs powers.138 The Court reasoned that the 
Administration’s reliance on the jurisprudence on presidential settlement of inter-
national claims was mistaken because, in that context, there was “a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and 
never before questioned.”139 By way of illustration, the Court quoted language 
from American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, approving a practice of executive 
134. 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent 
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that 
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”). This rule is limited to 
cases in which Congress has its own source of constitutional authority over the matter at issue and the 
President’s authority is not exclusive. Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 
(2015) (invalidating as violating the Executive’s exclusive power to recognize foreign governments a 
federal statute requiring the Department of State to list “Israel” on passports as the birth place of citizens 
born in Jerusalem). 
135. Michael J. Turner, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s Youngstown Taxonomy by 
Hamdan and Medellin, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 679–91 (2009). 
136. 552 U.S. 491, 523–24, 530–32 (2008). 
137. Id. at 525–29. The Court reasoned that the Treaty Clause divides the treaty power between the 
President, who makes treaties, and the Senate, which ratifies them. See id. at 526. If the President wishes 
a treaty to be self-executing, he must make that plain in the language of the document. Id. If he fails to 
do that, only Congress has the power to implement the treaty pursuant to its general lawmaking powers 
under Article I, Section 7. Id. at 526–27. 
138. Id. at 530–32. 
139. Id. at 531 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)). Although the Court 
attributed the quote to Dames & Moore, in which the Court adopted the rhetoric in its holding, the 
language is from Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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claims settlement “[g]iven the fact that the practice goes back over 200 years, and 
has received congressional acquiescence throughout its history.”140 
This is problematic for President Trump if he wishes to unilaterally terminate 
NAFTA under his independent foreign affairs powers without congressional au-
thorization. Far from having a two-hundred-year pedigree, unilateral presidential 
withdrawal from congressional–executive trade agreements is unprecedented.141 
Even the more limited reciprocity agreements of an earlier era, which were not 
congressional–executive agreements like NAFTA, were terminated by Congress 
in subsequent tariff acts, not the President (except where termination was accom-
plished under the RTAA by a simple withdrawal of a presidential proclamation 
adjusting tariffs).142 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRADE DEALING (AND THAT AWKWARD BUSINESS OF 
WITHDRAWAL) 
In the pre-GATT era, Congress set trade policy through a tariff act once or 
twice every decade. Indeed, “the tariff” was the stuff that could make or break 
careers among congressmen. Writing in 1940, Arthur Feiler repeated a story 
about a senior member of Congress advising a rookie on how to succeed on the 
Hill: “His whole wisdom was concentrated in the simple sentence: ‘Study the cus-
toms tariff law, young man; that is the essence of politics.’”143 
Arthur Feiler’s story pointed to the primacy of special interest groups and re-
gional constituencies over national unity.144 Trade policy was the province of 
Congress, and one of its most important. This section offers a brief overview of 
that history, with special attention to actions of Congress and the President 
140. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)). 
This narrowing or closing of Justice Jackson’s zone of twilight by the Court in Medellin is consistent 
with the Court’s deployment of the nondelegation doctrine. Although no modern statutes have been 
struck down on nondelegation grounds, where Congress has not defined the Executive’s role in a 
traditionally legislative arena, the Court will rely on the nondelegation doctrine to read statutes narrowly 
to deny executive power to act. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion); 
Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 
(1958); see also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 223 (explaining the Court enforces its “nondelegation doctrine by narrowly construing 
administrative statutes”). But see David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (“Judicial reliance upon the nondelegation 
doctrine as a source of constitutional authority to revise regulatory statutes could aggrandize the 
judiciary at the expense of the more democratic branches of government, and could significantly affect 
public law.”). 
Although not entirely congruent, the nondelegation doctrine and the second Youngstown category 
address a similar situation: when the Executive acts on what is understood to be a legislative power with 
little or no guidance from Congress. Both the use of the nondelegation doctrine as a narrowing principle 
of statutory construction, and the closing off of the second Youngstown category in Medellin, may be 
understood as judicial mechanisms to limit executive encroachments on legislative powers. 
141. See infra Section III.B. 
142. See infra Section IV.B. 
143. Arthur Feiler, The Trade Agreements Act, 9 AM. SCHOLAR 133, 133 (1940). 
144. Id. 
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concerning withdrawal from trade agreements. The actions demonstrate that both 
Branches considered withdrawal from trade deals to be a legislative prerogative. 
Prior to 1890, many trade agreements were made by treaty—negotiated by the 
President and submitted to the Senate for ratification.145 Although these agree-
ments were rarely ratified,146 the procedure under which they were negotiated 
was expressly provided for in the Treaty Clause. Beginning in 1890, however, 
Congress included provisions in its tariff acts that gave the President authority, ei-
ther expressly or by operation, to adjust certain tariffs through negotiations with 
trade partners to obtain better treatment for U.S. exports.147 Some statutes specifi-
cally allowed the President to enter into commercial treaties for tariff breaks. For 
example, the Dingley Tariff of 1897 authorized the President to make treaties 
lasting up to five years that would lower duties by up to twenty percent, or com-
pletely eliminate tariffs on any products that the United States did not produce in 
quantity, such as products of tropical agriculture.148 Other statutes provided for 
mechanisms that effectively triggered negotiations. The McKinley Act of 1890, 
for example, provided for duty-free imports of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and 
raw hides, but allowed the President to impose specified duties on those products 
from any country that imposed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” duties 
on U.S. products—in light of the duty-free treatment afforded by Congress.149 
The Payne–Aldrich Act of 1909 proposed a schedule of maximum tariffs and 
authorized the President to lower duties up to twenty-five percent for products of 
countries that did not “unduly discriminate” against U.S. products.150 In 1922, the 
Fordney–McCumber Act included a “flexibility” provision that allowed the 
President to raise or lower tariffs by up to fifty percent if the U.S. Tariff 
Commission found it necessary to equalize the costs of production between 
domestic and foreign products.151 That Act also included a provision that gave 
the President absolute discretion to impose penalties on countries that  
145. See U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, RECIPROCITY AND COMMERCIAL TREATIES 9, 21 (1919). 
146. See id.; see also DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE 309 tbl.6.4 (2017) (compiling 
reciprocity treaties and agreements). 
147. E.g., McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612 [hereinafter McKinley Act]; 
Dingley Tariff of 1897, ch. 11, §§ 3, 4, 30 Stat. 151, 203–05 [hereinafter Dingley Act]; Payne–Aldrich 
Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, §§ 2, 4, 36 Stat. 11, 82–83 [hereinafter Payne–Aldrich Act]; Underwood Tariff 
Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 4, 38 Stat. 114, 192; Fordney–McCumber Act of 1922, ch. 356, §§ 315, 317, 42 
Stat. 858, 941–46 [hereinafter Fordney–McCumber Act]; Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, §§ 
336, 338 [hereinafter Smoot–Hawley Act], 46 Stat. 590, 701–06; Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
1934, ch. 474, § 350(a), 48 Stat. 943, 943–44. 
148. Dingley Act, §§ 3–4, 30 Stat. at 203–05. 
149. McKinley Act, § 3, 26 Stat. at 612; see also Dingley Act § 3, 30 Stat. at 203–04 (authorizing the 
President to impose duties on the goods of states that impose any kind of duty on U.S. exports); Smoot– 
Hawley Act, §§ 336, 338, 46 Stat. at 701–06. 
150. See Payne–Aldrich Act, § 2, 36 Stat. at 82–83 (setting minimum–maximum tariff schedule). 
This provision differed from the McKinley and Dingley Acts’ reciprocity provisions by making 
presidential proclamations operate as a carrot instead of a stick to secure lower tariffs on U.S. products 
abroad. 
151. Fordney–McCumber Act of 1922, § 315, 42 Stat. at 941–43. 
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discriminated against U.S. exports.152 The effect of these provisions was to 
induce foreign sovereigns, worried about potential tariff hikes, to negotiate and 
strike deals with the United States to avoid being punished.153 
These “reciprocity” and “flexibility” provisions began when, in 1890, some 
political interests in the United States started to call for a retreat from the 
nineteenth-century policy of protectionism.154 In his annual address just before 
the 1888 presidential campaign, incumbent President Grover Cleveland stimu-
lated the “Great Debate” by calling for an end to protectionist tariffs.155 
Although Cleveland lost that election to protectionist Republicans,156 the new 
Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, convinced President Benjamin Harrison 
that the protectionist McKinley Tariff should include a reciprocity provi-
sion.157 The United States faced stiff competition from European producers in 
Latin American trade markets, and Blaine saw the reciprocity power as a 
means to secure better treatment of U.S. products in Latin America.158 
Although different Congresses were responding to different political and economic 
pressures between 1890 and 1930, provisions authorizing the President to raise or 
lower tariffs from the levels set by Congress appeared in nearly every tariff act during 
that time.159 Presidents had negotiated agreements under these provisions to obtain re-
ciprocal benefits and avoid penalties.160 This presented an obvious question when 
Congress removed the previous presidential authority: what was to become of the 
agreements entered into by the president pursuant to that old authority? 
1. Executive Insistence on Limited Executive Power 
This question vexed Congress when it passed the Wilson–Gorman Tariff Act 
in 1894, which repealed the reciprocity provisions in section 3 of the McKinley 
152. Id. § 317, 42 Stat. at 944–45. 
153. See, e.g., Letter from James G. Blaine, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, to Senhor Mendonc¸a 
(Nov. 3, 1890), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 43, 43–44 
(1891) (“I should be glad if you could advise me of the changes which Brazil would be willing to make 
in her system of tariff duties, in response to the changes proposed in the tariff of the United States which 
are favorable to your country.”). 
154. See DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION, AND FREE TRADE 99–100 (1988) (summarizing the 
early stages of this debate). 
155. See IRWIN, supra note 146, at 258–60. 
156. Id. at 261–63. 
157. See DAVID HEALY, JAMES G. BLAINE AND LATIN AMERICA 164–65 (2001) (“President 
Harrison . . . at first gave Blaine’s recriprocity program only limited support. . . . Before long, 
however, Blaine’s persuasion and the demands of western farmers moved the president firmly into the 
reciprocity camp.”). 
158. IRWIN, supra note 146, at 304. 
159. See supra note 147. The principal exception was the Wilson–Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 
349, § 71, 28 Stat. 509, 569 [hereinafter Wilson–Gorman Act], which eliminated the reciprocity 
provision of the McKinley Act without adding any new authority for the President to adjust tariffs. 
160. See Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: Hearings on H.R. 1211 Before the S. 
Comm. on Fin., 81st Cong. 1095–1121 (1949) (reprinting exchanges of diplomatic notes for twelve 
reciprocity agreements negotiated under McKinley Act between 1844 and 1934); U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, 
supra note 145, at 26–32 (describing reciprocity agreements entered into under statutory authority from 
1890 to 1919). 
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Act.161 Reciprocity had become unpopular among Democrats, now in the major-
ity of each chamber, who were unexcited by the souring of diplomatic relations 
with many U.S. trade partners as a result of section 3’s retaliatory effects.162 The 
House Committee on Ways and Means (the Committee) initially expressed the 
view that the new tariff bill intended “to repeal in toto section 3 of the tariff 
act.”163 The Committee expressed both constitutional and diplomatic objections 
to the old section 3, noting that it did not “believe that Congress can rightly vest 
in the President of the United States any authority or power to impose or release 
taxes on our people by proclamation or otherwise, or to suspend or dispense with 
the operation of a law of Congress.”164 The Committee’s constitutional objection 
is surprising in light of the Supreme Court’s decision the previous year, in 
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, rejecting the argument that Section 3 was an 
impermissible delegation of the legislative power to the President.165 The House 
did not go so far as to say, however, that repeal of section 3 of the McKinley Act 
would abrogate the existing agreements negotiated under its authority. In fact, the 
Chairman of the Committee stated on the House floor that repeal of section 3 
would merely remove the President’s discretion to issue future proclamations 
of retaliation—and thus remove trade partners’ incentives to negotiate future 
deals—rather than repudiate any existing agreements.166 Although the 
Committee felt that repealing the McKinley Act itself removed the President’s 
prospective retaliation authority, it took a belt-and-suspenders approach, pass-
ing an amendment introduced by the Chairman that specifically provided for 
the repeal of section 3.167 
However, if passed, the practical effect of the House amendment would have 
been to end the existing agreements. Once the President lacked authority to pro-
claim unjust and unreasonable discrimination and trigger higher duties, the 
161. Wilson–Gorman Act, §71, 28 Stat. at 569. The following discussion of the McKinley Act repeal 
is guided by a 1996 report by the U.S. Tariff Commission. See U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, supra note 145, at 
157–63. That report canvassed reciprocity’s ups and downs in advocating for a policy of “equality of 
treatment” among trade partners. Id. at 9–15. 
162. See H.R. REP. NO. 53-234, at 11 (1893) (stating that presidential proclamations under section 3 
of McKinley Act “have naturally led to ill-feeling in the countries thus discriminated against, and to 
diplomatic correspondence, in which it has been claimed with apparent justice that such discriminations 
were in violation of our solemn treaty obligations”). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 12; see also 26 CONG. REC. 1420 (1894) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (“We are repealing what 
we never believed was constitutional—the authority given to the President of the United States . . . .”); id. 
(statement of Rep. Simpson) (“Preventing one-man power and restoring it to the people.”). 
165. 143 U.S. 649, 680–90 (1892). 
166. See 26 CONG. REC. 1420 (1894). For example, when directly questioned, Chairman Wilson 
denied that the amendment would or should destroy the existing agreements: “Mr. SPRINGER. I 
understand that the gentleman from West Virginia contends that [the amendment] will destroy these 
agreements, because he is of the opinion that they ought not to have been made. Mr. WILSON of West 
Virginia. The gentleman is mistaken.” Id. 
167. See id. at 1425. The amendment was received with some sarcasm by Representative Dingley, 
the Maine Republican whose name would be on the 1897 bill reintroducing reciprocity. See id. at 1417 
(statement of Rep. Dingley) (“The effect of this amendment is not only to destroy reciprocity, but to 
emphasize the fact of its destruction.”). 
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incentive of the country’s trade partners to offer preferential entry to U.S. prod-
ucts would disappear, providing those partners with no reason to honor existing 
reciprocity agreements.168 The United States would be left with a list of duty-free 
products and no strategy for getting anything in return. 
The Senate was not so quick to accept either the loss of previously secured con-
cessions, or the prospect of getting more. Although the Senate bill also repealed 
section 3 of the McKinley Act, it sought to maintain the existing reciprocity 
agreements by expressly providing that “nothing herein contained shall be held to 
abrogate, or in any way affect such reciprocal commercial arrangements as have 
been heretofore made . . . except where such arrangements are inconsistent with 
the provisions of this act.”169 To keep from giving away too much to its trade part-
ners now that retaliation–reciprocity authority was repealed, the Senate bill 
placed duties on raw sugar and new, higher duties on refined sugar.170 The Senate 
amendment survived reconciliation as section 71 of the Wilson–Gorman Tariff 
Act.171 
But the reciprocity agreements failed anyway, because the Executive Branch 
insisted it no longer had the power to honor them. Before the passage of the 
Wilson–Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, the Brazilian representative complained to 
Secretary of State Gresham that the proposed sugar duties were inconsistent with 
the two countries’ reciprocity agreement.172 Gresham responded that the entire 
agreement—not just the provisions relating to duty-free sugar—was abrogated 
by Congress’s action in passing the new tariff law, telling the Brazilian minister, 
I think it clear that the reciprocity arrangement between Brazil and the United 
States was terminated by the going into force of our existing tariff law, and I 
do not think the Executive Departments can act upon any other theory. 
This is the view of the Secretary of the Treasury.173 
2. Congress Exercises Its Termination Power 
Reciprocity returned in the Dingley Act. Section 3 of the Dingley Act, which 
originated in the House, authorized the President to suspend duties on certain 
articles (primarily from France) based on entry into a reciprocal treaty, and to 
impose penalties on tropical products on the duty-free list if the exporting coun-
tries did not grant reciprocal concessions to U.S. products.174 
168. See id. at 1421 (statement of Rep. Dingley) (after repeal of section 3 “those trade agreements 
will at once fall”). 
169. Id. at 7110 (restating Senate bill). 
170. See LAKE, supra note 154, at 114–15. 
171. 26 CONG. REC. 8473, 8486 (1894). 
172. See Letter from W.Q. Gresham, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, to Senhor Mendonc¸a (Aug. 29, 
1894), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 153, at 77. 
173. Id. 
174. Dingley Act, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203–04 (1897). The Dingley Act also included a 
provision drafted by the Senate that authorized the President to enter into agreements for up to five 
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By 1909, however, reciprocity had become politically unpopular,175 and the 
Payne–Aldrich Act once again moved away from reciprocity agreements.176 The 
Senate bill, with an amendment by Senator Aldrich, provided for maximum– 
minimum tariff schedules instead of reciprocity with certain maximum duties to 
be applied, but where the President proclaimed that a country did not discriminate 
against U.S. products, an alternative, minimum tariff set out in the statute would 
be charged instead.177 
Most important for present purposes, the Payne–Aldrich Act expressly abro-
gated all agreements entered into under the reciprocity provisions of the Dingley 
Act. In section 4, Congress authorized and required the President to give notice to 
all trade-partner countries under the terms of the agreements, or months’ notice if 
the agreement had no termination clause: 
That the President shall have power and it shall be his duty to give notice, 
within ten days after the passage of this Act, to all foreign countries with which 
commercial agreements in conformity with the authority granted by section 
three of [the Dingley Act] . . . have been or shall have been entered into, of the 
intention of the United States to terminate such agreement . . . .178 
This provision signaled Congress’s view that it had the competence to termi-
nate the agreements as a function of its tariff-making power, and it could do so 
without regard to any specific conditions of discrimination or reciprocity found 
by the President. In section 4 of the Payne–Aldrich Act, “the intention of the 
United States” to terminate trade agreements was synonymous with the intention 
of Congress. The President was not consulted, but ordered to execute that will. 
During this period of reciprocity and flexibility provisions, scholars apparently 
agreed with Secretary Gresham that Congress possessed the power to abrogate 
the agreements made by the President.179 In 1922, Quincy Wright wrote that 
agreements made by the President as head of the Executive Branch pursuant to 
legislative authorization “appear to be dependent for their effectiveness upon the 
authorizing legislation, and are terminable, both nationally and internationally, at 
the discretion of Congress.”180 Wright was apparently including the reciprocity 
agreements in this category, given that he illustrated his point by quoting 
years, lowering most duties twenty percent and eliminating duties on products not produced by the 
United States. Id. § 4. This latter provision, although signaling the Senate’s wishes, did not give the 
president power he did not already possess under the Treaty Clause because these “commercial treaties” 
were subject to “the advice and consent of the Senate.” Id. 
175. See LAKE, supra note 154, at 131. 
176. See U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, supra note 145, at 265 (citing continued discrimination against U.S. 
products in Europe, Senate’s refusal to ratify Dingley Act reciprocity treaties, lack of public attention to 
agreements with France, and domestic producers’ desire for protection). 
177. Payne–Aldrich Act, ch. 6, § 2, 36 Stat. 11, 82 (1909). 
178. Id. § 4, 36 Stat. at 83. 
179. See WRIGHT, supra note 95, at 235–36. 
180. Id. 
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Secretary Gresham’s letter to Mr. Mendonc¸a of Brazil regarding abrogation of 
the McKinley Act agreements.181 
3. New Deal Reciprocity: Expansion and Limits of Presidential Power 
In 1934, President Roosevelt sought to free himself from the strictures of the 
most infamous tariff act in U.S. history, the Smoot–Hawley Act of 1930.182 
For a discussion of the passage of this “protectionist measure opposed by all right-thinking 
people,” see The Battle of Smoot-Hawley, ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/12798595 [https://perma.cc/G7HP-X4A3]. Lake persuasively demonstrates that the Smoot– 
Hawley Act was not as protectionist as is commonly thought: although the average rate of duty under the 
Smoot–Hawley Act, 55.3%, is the highest in U.S. history, the Act also contained the second-largest 
number of items on the free list, 65.5%. See LAKE, supra note 154, at 194–95. Because of the expanded 
free list, the average duty imposed by the Smoot–Hawley Act was only 19%. By comparison, other 
average rates of duty under tariff acts of the reciprocity era were: 23.7% (McKinley Act); 20.5% 
(Wilson–Gorman Act); 26.2% (Dingley Act); 20.0% (Payne–Aldrich Act); 8.8% (Underwood Act); and 
38.2% (Fordney–McCumber Act). See id. at 101, 106, 125, 133, 154–55, 167. 
Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, believed that reciprocal trade agree-
ments would precipitate peaceful relations between countries—sort of a 1930s 
take on Thomas Friedman’s “golden arches theory of conflict prevention.”183 
Friedman, also an advocate of trade as a strategy for achieving peace, posited that no two 
countries with McDonald’s had ever gone to war. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE 
OLIVE TREE 195–218 (1999); Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs Big Mac I, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/opinion/foreign-affairs-big-mac-i.html [https://nyti.ms/ 
2kvU6p2]. For a similar perspective, see 1 THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL: IN TWO VOLUMES 84 
(1948) [hereinafter HULL], stating that “if we could increase commercial exchanges among nations over 
lowered trade and tariff barriers and remove unnatural obstructions to trade, we would go a long way 
toward eliminating war itself.” 
Hull essentially made it his mission to obtain reciprocity authority for the 
President.184 
There appeared to be no question in Roosevelt’s or Hull’s mind that such 
authority must come from Congress. During the campaign, Hull had proposed a 
direct ten-percent reduction in tariffs in the next tariff bill, but the politics of the 
Great Depression left that proposal dead on arrival.185 Instead, the Roosevelt 
Administration proposed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA). Crafted 
as a three-page amendment to the Smoot–Hawley Act, the RTAA allowed the 
President to reduce tariffs by up to fifty percent in connection with a reciprocal 
trade deal from a negotiating partner.186 These tariffs would not require any form 
of congressional approval, but the President’s negotiating authority would expire 
three years after enactment.187 
Neither Roosevelt nor Hull attempted to exercise any form of negotiating 
authority before receiving authorization from Congress. In June 1933, Hull 
181. Id. 
182. 
183. 
184. See HULL, supra note 183, at 354; see also DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 9–10 
(1969). 
185. See IRWIN, supra note 146, at 423 (“[A] unilateral tariff reduction was politically impossible in 
the midst of the Depression with the unemployment rate so high.”). 
186. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, § 350(a)(2), 48 Stat. 943, 943. 
187. Id. § 2(c), 48 Stat. at 944. The President’s negotiating authority was renewed in 1937, 1940, and 
1943. See IRWIN, supra note 146, at 443–54. 
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traveled to the World Economic Conference in London, eager to begin negotia-
tions with other countries.188 While he was there, Roosevelt sent word to Hull 
that he was not yet prepared to request reciprocal negotiating authority from 
Congress.189 Instead, Roosevelt suggested that Hull only begin negotiations of 
commercial treaties because no congressional authorization was needed merely 
to negotiate.190 Roosevelt did not view the Executive Branch to have plenary 
authority over such agreements but was merely following the Treaty Clause pro-
cess.191 As Roosevelt told Hull, “All such agreements [negotiated by Hull in 
London], both general and bilateral, would be submitted for approval as soon as 
Congress reassembles.”192 Hull viewed the delay as a devastating blow to his 
agenda.193 
As eventually passed, the RTAA empowered the President to make tariff 
adjustments through simple proclamations, and thus withdrawal of lower tariffs 
could be accomplished simply by withdrawing the proclamation.194 The with-
drawal of reciprocity to Czechoslovakia after German occupation is instructive. 
President Roosevelt had entered into a trade agreement with the country on 
March 7, 1938, with an addendum on April 15, 1938.195 The agreement was 
made effective in U.S. law by proclamations under the RTAA dated March 15 
and April 15, of 1938.196 The following year, after German occupation of 
Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, Roosevelt issued a proclamation terminating 
the tariff preferences extended to Czechoslavakia—not by terminating the agree-
ments of March 7 and April 15, but by terminating the proclamations that notified 
the agreement and addendum to the United States on March 15 and April 15.197 
The RTAA was a significant expansion of presidential authority compared 
with the old tariff acts. Roosevelt advocated in his request to Congress that 
the economic situation demanded decisive executive action on trade and reas-
surance to Congress that the new executive authority would be “within care-
fully guarded limits.”198 As Ackerman and Golove have noted, however,  
188. HULL, supra note 183, at 248–51. 
189. See Letter from Hull, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, to Gilbert, Consul at Geneva (Sept. 29, 
1933), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1933, GENERAL 776, 777 
(1950). 
190. See HULL, supra note 183, at 251. 
191. Id. at 251–52. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, § 350(a)(2), 48 Stat. 943, 943. In most 
cases, the reciprocity agreements entered into under the RTAA before 1940 were withdrawn or 
suspended by agreement whenever the trading partner entered into the GATT. See U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, 
TRADE AGREEMENTS MANUAL 5–7 (3d ed. 1959). 
195. See Proclamation No. 2326, 4 Fed. Reg. 1367 (Mar. 30, 1939). 
196. See id. 
197. See id. 
198. 78 CONG. REC. 3579 (1934). 
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no one contended that RTAA agreements were congressional–executive agree-
ments.199 In the RTAA and in all earlier examples of reciprocity and flexibility 
provisions, a few factors remained constant: Congress started the bidding by 
passing tariff legislation that set rates for all items of commerce; Congress set 
and frequently altered the boundaries of presidential authority to make changes 
to those tariffs; and Congress could undo any executive-made deals by repeal-
ing the underlying tariff act. Although the RTAA expanded presidential 
authority significantly, that new authority was still limited to lowering tariffs 
by proclamation and removing those advantages by withdrawing the proclama-
tion. Any such tariff breaks had to be within a percentage reduction and time 
period limited by Congress. 
For present purposes, the most important aspect of the RTAA is this: however 
expansive the President’s new authority, it was Congress—not the President— 
that did the expanding. When Roosevelt sought to respond to trade conditions 
with greater nimbleness, he did not purport to possess that authority; he went to 
Congress and asked for it. If even the most ambitious re-interpreter of presidential 
authority ever to occupy the White House believed that Congress possesses the 
constitutional authority over entering trade deals, it would be difficult to argue 
today that the President possesses independent constitutional authority to with-
draw from them. History suggests that the better answer is that the President has 
only as much withdrawal power as Congress has afforded him. 
IV. WOULD PRESIDENTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM NAFTA TERMINATE U.S. 
OBLIGATIONS? 
To briefly recap: although the President could deliver notice of withdrawal that 
Canada and Mexico would likely recognize under international law, the weight 
of authority suggests that the President does not have the statutory or independent 
constitutional power to do so. Even if he could legally effect withdrawal, that 
would raise another legal question: would withdrawal from NAFTA necessarily 
terminate the statute through which NAFTA obligations were implemented into 
U.S. law? After all, that statute—the NAFTA Implementation Act—was passed 
by Congress. Would the statute continue in force unless repealed by Congress? If 
so, then withdrawing from NAFTA does not really end NAFTA (the trade prefer-
ences, as enacted into U.S. law). Or does the statute terminate by its terms once 
the U.S. withdraws from the international agreement that prompted it? If so, then 
withdrawing from NAFTA really does put an end to NAFTA (the trade 
preferences). 
Several commentators have suggested that the NAFTA Implementation Act 
would survive a U.S. notice of withdrawal from NAFTA and that the obligations 
would continue in domestic law, even if the United States technically withdrew 
199. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 860 (“If NAFTA had been negotiated in 1937, 
Roosevelt would have submitted it as a treaty to the Senate without recognizing that he had a choice in 
the matter.”). 
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from the Agreement.200 However, a careful reading of the text and accompanying 
documents of the NAFTA Implementation Act and a comparison with other trade 
agreements suggests that Congress likely intended the trade obligations of 
NAFTA to cease being operative in domestic law if the United States withdraws 
from the Agreement. But this also means that termination of the statute might be 
dependent upon what it means for “the United States” to withdraw from the 
Agreement, and who may do the withdrawing. This question would involve a 
court making the same analysis of the statutory and constitutional scope of the 
President’s authority to withdraw from fast track trade agreements, as discussed 
in Part III, and would present some (though not all) of the justiciability concerns 
discussed in Part V. To see how the termination issue may encompass the consti-
tutionality and justiciability questions, this Part analyzes the termination provi-
sions of the NAFTA Implementation Act and their implications for unilateral 
presidential withdrawal. 
A. THE “TERMINATOR” CLAUSE: CEASING TO BE A NAFTA COUNTRY 
In section 109(b), the NAFTA Implementation Act provides for situations in 
which the Act will cease to have effect.201 It is a terminator provision inserted by 
Congress under which the Act self-destructs if certain conditions occur. 
Unfortunately, however, the provision is hardly a model of clarity. Section 109 
(b) says: 
(b) TERMINATION OF NAFTA STATUS. – During any period in which a country 
ceases to be a NAFTA country, [the implementing provisions of the Act] 
shall cease to have effect with respect to such country.202 
Fair enough. But when does a country “cease[] to be a NAFTA country”? Does 
that only refer to withdrawal by Mexico or Canada, or could it include a case 
where the United States withdraws? “NAFTA country” is defined as: 
(A) 
 
Canada for such time as the Agreement is in force with respect to, and the 
United States applies the Agreement to, Canada; and 
(B) Mexico for such time as the Agreement is in force with respect to, and the 
United States applies the Agreement to, Mexico.203 
200. See, e.g., Aleem, supra note 10, at 4 (presenting argument by Todd Tucker that Trump’s 
withdrawal would create “a Zombie NAFTA, where America’s formal participation is dead, but our 
domestic law would still treat Canadian and Mexican products as if it weren’t”); Ku & Yoo, supra note 
10 (arguing that Trump cannot unilaterally terminate U.S. participation in NAFTA because 
implementing statute “can be reversed only by another, repealing statute enacted by the House and the 
Senate and then signed by the president”). 
201. NAFTA Implementation Act § 109(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (2012). 
202. 19 U.S.C. § 2112. 
203. Id. § 3301(4)(A)–(B). 
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Thus, it seems clear (and logical) that Canada or Mexico would “cease[] to be 
a NAFTA country” if it withdrew from the Agreement. But how are we to under-
stand this second condition, that a country is only a NAFTA country as long as 
“the United States applies the Agreement to” them? 
The only authoritative sources of legislative history are the House and Senate 
Reports, and those Reports are cursory in their discussion of section 109(b). The 
House Report essentially repeats the language of the statute.204 The Senate 
Report is not much more extensive, but it does paraphrase, which may shed light 
on the Senate’s understanding of the provision. The Senate Report says that the 
implementing provisions of the act “shall cease to have effect with respect to a 
country during any period in which that country ceases to be a party to the 
NAFTA.”205 This seems to contemplate only cases where Canada or Mexico 
withdraws, not where the United States withdraws. 
But in that case, what does the statute mean when it says that the Act termi-
nates unless the Agreement is in force with respect to, and the United States 
applies the agreement to, Canada or Mexico? According to the canon against sur-
plusage, the second clause must have a meaning that is distinct from the first.206 
The Senate Report’s description seems to make it redundant, if the Act’s provi-
sions terminate only when the other party pulls out. 
The floor debates are neither authoritative as a source of statutory interpreta-
tion207 nor extensive, because NAFTA was passed under procedures designed 
precisely to curtail congressional debate on trade agreements.208 Thus, the legisla-
tive history seems to deepen rather than resolve the confusion. 
B. “CEAS[ING] TO APPLY THE AGREEMENT” IN THE STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 
Although section 109(b) is murky about what it means to “cease[] to apply the 
agreement,” there is another provision that sheds light on it. In section 101(a)(2) 
204. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION ACT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. REP. NO. 103-361, at 25 (1993) 
(“[The implementing provisions of the act] shall cease to have effect with respect to a country during 
any period in which that country ceases to be a NAFTA country.”). 
205. SEN. REP. NO. 103-89, at 12 (1993) (emphasis added). 
206. For recent applications of the canon against surplusage, see Fifth Third Bancorp v. 
Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–22 (2014); Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 132–33 (2014). 
207. The Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f legislative history is to be considered, it is preferable to 
consult the documents prepared by Congress when deliberating.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 
561, 580 (1995). The Committee Reports on the bill and statements by legislators offer the most 
authoritative evidence of congressional intent when these statements are consistent with the statutory 
text or other pieces of legislative history. Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986); Garcia v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567 (1984); Zuber v. 
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); see also Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez–Torres, 787 F. Supp. 2d 149, 
170 (D.P.R. 2011) (“The words of a legislative body itself, written or spoken contemporaneously with 
the passage of a statute, are usually the most authoritative guide to legislative purpose.” (quoting Cherry 
Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2007))). 
208. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191(b)(3), (c)–(d), (f)–(g), 2192(d)–(f) (2012). 
Following its submission by the President, the bill implementing a trade agreement must be approved by 
both houses of Congress by a simple majority and without debate. Id. 
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of the Act, Congress approved “the statement of administrative action proposed 
to implement [NAFTA].”209 The NAFTA statement of administrative action 
(SAA) was prepared in accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 and describes significant administrative actions proposed to imple-
ment the agreement.210 
In the SAA, one issue discussed was the relationship between the NAFTA ba-
sic agreement, negotiated by President George H.W. Bush, and the side agree-
ments on labor and environment, negotiated by President Bill Clinton.211 The 
issue arose because Title I of the NAFTA Implementation Act required Mexico 
and Canada to pass the side agreements for Congress to approve the basic agree-
ment.212 But what if Mexico or Canada withdrew from the side agreements? 
Would the United States continue to adhere to the basic agreement without guar-
anteed protections for labor and the environment? 
The SAA proposed a resolution to this potential dilemma: “The Administration, 
after thorough consultation with the Congress, would provide notice of withdrawal 
under the NAFTA, and cease to apply that Agreement, to Mexico or Canada if ei-
ther country withdraws from a supplemental agreement.”213 Here, Congress and 
the Administration contemplate a test case where the United States would pull out 
of NAFTA with respect to one or both other parties if those parties withdrew from 
the side agreements. The language the Administration used, and Congress adopted 
in section 101(a)(2), echoes the language used in sections 2 and 109(b): if Mexico 
or Canada were to withdraw from the side agreements, the United States would 
“cease to apply” NAFTA to that country.214 And the definitions tell us a country is 
only a “NAFTA country” as long as “the United States applies the Agreement to” 
that country.215 Section 109(b) thus closes the loop: once a country “cease[s] to be 
a NAFTA country,” the NAFTA Implementation Act’s implementing provisions 
terminate with respect to that country.216 
Thus, under the SAA, the United States could provide a notice of withdrawal 
to Canada or Mexico if that country withdrew from the side agreements, and the 
implementing provisions of the NAFTA Implementation Act would terminate 
209. NAFTA Implementation Act § 101(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3311(a)(2) (2012). 
210. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION ACT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 1 (1993). 
Section 1103 of the Omnibus Act says that a trade agreement entered into under that Act will enter into 
force only after the President transmits to both chambers of Congress the text of the agreement, along 
with a draft implementing bill and “a statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the 
trade agreement,” 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012), and “an explanation as to how the implementing 
bill and proposed administrative action will change or affect existing law,” id. § 2903(a)(2)(A). 
211. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.–Can.–Mex., Sep. 14, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994); North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.– 
Can.–Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993). 
212. NAFTA Implementation Act § 101(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(2). 
213. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 456 (emphasis added). 
214. Compare H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 456, and NAFTA Implementation Act § 3311(a)(2), with 
id. § 3301(4)(A)–(B), and § 2122(b). 
215. NAFTA Implementation Act § 311(a)(2). 
216. Id. § 2122. 
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with respect to that country. It seems apparent, the same result would follow 
under sections 2 and 109(b) if the United States gave Canada, Mexico, or both 
notice of withdrawal for any other reason. 
C. COMPARISON WITH OTHER IMPLEMENTATION ACTS 
This reading of the NAFTA Implementation Act’s termination provision makes 
sense when laid side by side with the termination clauses in other multilateral and 
bilateral agreements. Since the implementation of NAFTA, the United States has 
entered into a dozen other such agreements, each with provisions expressing con-
ditions of termination.217 
See Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/ 
free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/YT3X-D8W3] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). The United States has 
free trade agreements in force with Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore. Id. 
For example, the United States–Colombia Trade 
Promotion Agreement says, “(c) TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT. – On the date 
on which the Agreement terminates, this Act . . . and the amendments made by 
this Act . . . shall cease to have effect.”218 That provision is clearer, but also an eas-
ier case than NAFTA. As a bilateral agreement, the U.S.–Colombia agreement 
would terminate if either party withdrew. The termination provisions of other 
bilateral trade agreement implementing acts are similarly straightforward.219 
Because NAFTA involves three parties, one of whom might withdraw without 
affecting the intentions of the other two, drafting a termination provision would 
naturally be more complicated. A more relevant comparator, then, might be the 
statute implementing another multilateral trade agreement, like the Dominican 
Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act.220 The underlying agreement, better known as CAFTA or CAFTA–DR, is a 
trade deal between the United States, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. As with NAFTA, one of the par-
ties could withdraw, and the Agreement would remain in force for the parties 
remaining in the Agreement 
217. 
218. United States–Columbia Trade Promotion Agreement, Pub. L. No. 112-42, § 107(c), 125 Stat. 
462, 466 (2011) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2012)). 
219. See, e.g., Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108- 
286, § 106(c), 118 Stat. 919, 923 (2004) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note and scattered sections of 19 
U.S.C.) (“On the date on which the Agreement terminates, the provisions of this Act (other than this 
subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to be effective.”); Dominican Republic– 
Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53 § 
107(d), 119 Stat. 462, 466 (2005) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4001 note) (“On the date on which the 
Agreement ceases to be in force with respect to the United States, the provisions of this Act (other than 
this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to have effect.”). It may be noted, 
however, that the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement allows for the accession of other 
parties. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Austl., art. 23.1, May 18, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 6422. 
220. See Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, § 3, 119 Stat. 462, 463 (2005) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4002). 
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The statute that implemented CAFTA–DR is clearer about the effects of termi-
nation than is the NAFTA Implementation Act. The implementation act for 
CAFTA–DR reads: 
(c) TERMINATION OF CAFTA–DR STATUS.—During any period in which a 
country ceases to be a CAFTA-DR country, the provisions of this Act 
(other than this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall 
cease to have effect with respect to that country. 
(d) TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT.—On the date on which the Agreement 
ceases to be in force with respect to the United States, the provisions of this 
Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall 
cease to have effect.221 
A “CAFTA–DR country” is defined for each country in the following manner: 
“[T]he term ‘CAFTA–DR country’ means – Costa Rica, for such time as the 
Agreement is in force between the United States and Costa Rica.”222 This termi-
nation provision seems more straightforward than the comparable NAFTA provi-
sion. The implementation act for CAFTA–DR does not refer to the United States 
“appl[ying] the agreement to” any country.223 As long as the Agreement is in 
force between the United States and a particular country, that country is a 
CAFTA–DR country. If the Agreement ceases to be in force between the United 
States and that country, the Implementation Act terminates with respect to that 
country (and that country only). But if the Agreement “ceases to be in force with 
respect to the United States,” then the Implementation Act terminates completely 
(apart from the termination provision itself). 
Section 109, the termination provision of the NAFTA Implementation Act, 
does not expressly say what happens when the Agreement ceases to be in force 
with respect to the United States—in other words, when the United States with-
draws. But reading the SAA (as adopted by Congress in section 101(a)(2)) to-
gether with the definitions in section 2 and the termination provision of section 
109(b) produces the same result as in the implementation act for CAFTA–DR: 
the United States ceases to apply the Agreement to another country when the 
United States withdraws from the Agreement, and the Act terminates. Though 
the drafting may have become more artful in the decade between implementation 
of NAFTA and CAFTA–DR, a close reading suggests the intended effect was the 
same. 
In contrast, the implementing act for the WTO Agreements expressly states 
that Congress’s approval of the deal will terminate only by a joint resolution to  
221. 19 U.S.C. § 4001 note. 
222. Id. § 4002(2)(A). 
223. Compare Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, 119 Stat. 462, with NAFTA Implementation Act § 2, 19 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012). 
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that effect.224 Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), 
which implemented the WTO Agreements into U.S. law, provides that “[t]he ap-
proval of Congress . . . of the WTO Agreement shall cease to be effective if, and 
only if, a joint resolution . . . is enacted into law” in the manner prescribed in the 
following section.225 The URAA is specific about the procedure and language 
that must be used to withdraw congressional approval: Congress must adopt and 
transmit the joint resolution within ninety days after receiving the President’s 
five-year report. If the President vetoes the joint resolution, both chambers must 
vote to override the veto within either the ninety-day period from the report or 
within fifteen days of receiving the President’s veto.226 The joint resolution must 
state, after the resolving clause, “[t]hat the Congress withdraws its approval, pro-
vided under section 101(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, of the WTO 
Agreement as defined in section 2(9) of that Act.”227 
Thus, the URAA provides a counterexample: instead of terminating by its 
terms upon United States withdrawal from the underlying agreement, the URAA 
requires a specific joint resolution to terminate the implementing provisions in 
domestic law. Although the President could deliver a notice of intent to withdraw 
to the other Member States in the WTO, the domestic implementation of those 
trade obligations would continue in force as long as congressional approval under 
Section 101(a) of the URAA remains in force. Section 125(b) makes clear that 
this approval can be withdrawn only by Congress. The role of the President is 
limited to making a report to Congress every five years of the costs and benefits 
of participation and value of continued participation.228 
The legislative history is equally clear that Congress intended to exercise af-
firmative control over the removal of domestic obligations arising from the WTO 
Agreements. The House Report of section 125 reads, 
The purpose of this provision is to provide an opportunity for Congress to eval-
uate the transition of the GATT to the WTO and to assess periodically whether 
continued membership in this organization is in the best interest of the United 
States. It is the desire of the Committee not to leave this decision totally in the 
hands of the Executive Branch but to be active in determining whether the 
WTO is an effective organization for achieving common trade goals and prin-
ciples and for settling trade disputes among sovereign nations.229 
Section 109 of the NAFTA Implementation Act does not precisely track the 
“terminator” language of the implementation act for CAFTA–DR or similar 
224. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 125(b), 108 Stat. 4809, 4833 
(1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3535(b) (2012)). 
225. 19 U.S.C. § 3535(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 125 refers to section 101(a) of the Act, in 
which Congress gave its approval to “the trade agreements . . . resulting from the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations” under the GATT. Id. § 3511(a). 
226. Id. § 3535(b)(2). 
227. Id. § 3535(c)(1). 
228. See id. § 3535(a). 
229. H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt. 1, at 34 (1994). 
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implementing provisions for other bilateral trade agreements, but neither does it 
exclusively reserve the termination decision for an affirmative act of Congress as 
the URAA does. Because the URAA was enacted only one year later than the 
NAFTA Implementation Act, the dissimilarity between the two termination pro-
visions supports the notion that Congress did not intend to require some affirma-
tive termination mechanism for the NAFTA Implementation Act, but intended 
the implementing provisions of that Act to terminate automatically if the United 
States withdrew from the Agreement. Because the NAFTA Implementation Act 
termination provisions are more like the termination provisions in the implemen-
tation act for CAFTA–DR than in the URAA, Congress likely intended the 
NAFTA Implementation Act to terminate automatically if the United States gives 
notice of withdrawal from the Agreement. No additional action or repeal by 
Congress appears to be required. 
D. “AFTER THOROUGH CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS”: LIMITS ON WITHDRAWAL 
POWER IN THE STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
Even if the implementing provisions of the statute were designed to terminate 
without congressional repeal, if the United States were to withdraw from 
NAFTA, the ultimate question remains: what constitutes a valid withdrawal for 
purposes of the NAFTA Implementation Act? In other words, does the United 
States “cease[] to apply the Agreement to”230 Mexico and Canada whenever the 
President delivers notice of withdrawal, even if such action is beyond the scope 
of the President’s authority? Or does the statute contemplate automatic termina-
tion only upon withdrawal by some other procedure, if required by the fast track 
statutes or the Constitution? 
The SAA suggests that something more than unilateral presidential withdrawal 
might be required to trigger the termination provision of the NAFTA 
Implementation Act. Recall that one of the issues addressed in the SAA was how 
the United States would respond if Mexico or Canada withdrew from the labor or 
environmental side agreements.231 Recall also the Administration’s response to 
this dilemma in the SAA: “The Administration, after thorough consultation with 
the Congress, would provide notice of withdrawal under the NAFTA, and cease 
to apply that Agreement, to Mexico or Canada if either country withdraws from a 
supplemental agreement.”232 
Section IV.B focused on the second part of this sentence, that the United States 
would “cease to apply [NAFTA], to Mexico or Canada” in that eventuality.233 
But the first part of the sentence, that “[t]he Administration, after thorough con-
sultation with the Congress, would provide notice of withdrawal under the 
NAFTA,” is also remarkable. At least in the enumerated circumstances, United 
230. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION ACT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 456 
(1993). 
231. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. 
232. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 456 (emphasis added). 
233. See supra Section IV.B. 
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States withdrawal is to be accomplished by the President “after thorough consul-
tation with the Congress.”234 Because the SAA was incorporated into domestic 
law as part of the NAFTA Implementation Act,235 it appears that the President 
proposed, and Congress agreed, that the President would withdraw from NAFTA 
only “after thorough consultation with Congress” if Mexico or Canada withdrew 
from the labor or environmental side agreements.236 
This provision, on its face, applies only in the instance that the United States 
seeks to withdraw from NAFTA because Mexico or Canada withdraws from the 
side agreements. It is not clear whether the commitment to a “thorough consulta-
tion with the Congress” applies in all circumstances of U.S. withdrawal.237 The 
SAA does suggest, however, that withdrawal was not viewed as a unilateral pre-
rogative of the President. At least in those circumstances where withdrawal was 
specifically contemplated, the President and Congress both believed that 
Congress was to play a role. 
If a court were to reach this argument, its implications would be far-reaching. 
Statutory interpretation of the phrase “ceases to apply the Agreement to” Mexico 
or Canada would involve analysis of the entire fast track statutory scheme and the 
constitutional architecture surrounding congressional–executive trade agreement— 
the same analysis performed in Parts II and III of this Article. However, because 
the result of this inquiry would only affect the operation of a domestic statute, a 
court may be less likely to consider the political question doctrine to be a barrier 
to adjudication in this context than in a direct constitutional challenge to unilat-
eral presidential withdrawal from NAFTA.238 Thus, urging a court to consider 
the legality of unilateral presidential withdrawal for the purposes of the NAFTA 
Implementation Act termination provisions might provide a nimble strategy to 
avoid some of the justiciability issues presented by a direct challenge, as dis-
cussed in Part V. 
V. IS THERE A REMEDY FOR EXECUTIVE OVERREACH? 
If unilateral presidential action withdrawing the United States from NAFTA 
would be a statutory and constitutional overreach, what can be done about it? 
Because the issue arises only in the event that Congress opposes the President’s 
action, the question raises immediate red flags of justiciability, including standing 
and political question concerns. There is no precedent directly on point, but there 
are strong arguments based on Supreme Court and other federal court precedents 
that might persuade a court to treat a challenge to Executive withdrawal from 
234. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 456. 
235. See NAFTA Implementation Act § 101(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3311(a)(2) (2012). 
236. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-159, at 456. 
237. Id. 
238. A lawsuit challenging the operation of a statute that creates only domestic obligations may 
cause less risk of “embarrassment” within the realm of foreign relations than a challenge to the 
President’s power to withdraw. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962); infra notes 306–08 
and accompanying text. 
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NAFTA differently from actions that challenged entry into NAFTA239 or presi-
dential withdrawal from treaties.240 Moreover, a court may be more inclined to 
reach the merits because the substantive issues could be resolved using conven-
tional principles of statutory construction and familiar exercises in constitutional 
interpretation, avoiding the need for sweeping judicial pronouncements about 
any lacunae in the Constitution.241 
A. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION: RESOLUTION, LEGISLATION, OR OTHER POLITICAL 
PRESSURE 
Some commentators have speculated that courts will refuse to hear a challenge 
to NAFTA withdrawal.242 An obvious hurdle appears in Goldwater v. Carter, a 
case in which the Supreme Court, in a widely followed plurality opinion, articu-
lated a strict political question doctrine limiting justiciability of claims between 
Branches.243 But the first place to look for a remedy to unilateral presidential 
withdrawal may be to the “preeminent speaker”244 on regulation of foreign com-
merce: Congress. 
Political questions, after all, are not necessarily questions without a remedy— 
they are merely questions without a judicial remedy. Congress has a variety of 
tools at its disposal if it believes that unilateral presidential withdrawal violates 
the statutory framework and its foreign commerce powers. 
1. “Sense of” Resolutions 
First (and easiest), the House, Senate, or Congress could express its opinion on 
the matter through a “sense of” resolution.245 “Sense of” resolutions take the form 
of a simple resolution (“Sense of the House” or “Sense of the Senate”) or a  
239. See e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(declining to reach the merits of a challenge to the enactment of NAFTA because “the question of just 
what constitutes a ‘treaty’ requiring Senate ratification presents a nonjusticiable political question”). 
240. See e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (plurality opinion) (finding that a 
challenge by members of Congress to the President’s termination of a treaty with Taiwan was a 
nonjusticiable political question “because it involve[d] the authority of the President in the conduct of 
[the] country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to 
negate the action of the President”); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that 
plaintiff members of Congress challenging the President’s withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty lacked standing under Raines v. Byrd because they alleged only an institutional injury to 
Congress, and that the challenge raised a nonjusticiable political question under Goldwater v. Carter). 
241. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (finding lack of judicially manageable 
standards to decide whether Senate’s constitutional mandate to “try” impeachment cases required the 
whole Senate to hear witness testimony). 
242. See, e.g., Hufbauer, supra note 54. 
243. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002–06. 
244. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994). 
245. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-825, “SENSE OF” 
RESOLUTIONS AND PROVISIONS (2016) (report was originally written by Paul S. Rundquist in 1999). 
“Sense of Congress” resolutions are used to express “fact, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two 
houses.” THOMAS J. WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192, at 205 (2017). 
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concurrent resolution (“Sense of Congress”).246 
See DAVIS, supra note 245, at 1; see also Bills and Resolutions, U.S. SENATE, https://www. 
senate.gov/legislative/bills.htm [https://perma.cc/8JWB-RC3B] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).  
Because “sense of” resolutions 
are not presented to the President, they do not have the force of law.247 “Sense of” 
resolutions are used for a variety of political purposes, most importantly in this 
context to communicate congressional will or to communicate the body’s inten-
tions to foreign governments.248 Congress may also include “sense of” provisions 
in legislation, subject to germaneness limitations.249 
“Sense of” resolutions are often used to express the opinion of Congress about 
foreign affairs.250 In 2004, Congress expressed its disapproval of President 
Bush’s decision to mobilize 20,000 troops to Iraq.251 
H.R. Con. Res. 63, 110th Cong. (2007). Though styled as a concurrent resolution, the House- 
initiated measure failed to pass in the Senate. See Shailagh Murray, Iraq Vote in Senate Blocked by 
GOP, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/ 
17/AR2007021700247.html [https://perma.cc/K42M-C4ET]. 
The Senate also introduced 
a simple resolution with respect to President Carter’s withdrawal from the Sino– 
American Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, but the resolution was never 
passed.252 
2. Joint Resolutions 
Another tool available to Congress is the joint resolution. Although the proce-
dure for consideration and passage of a joint resolution is the same as that for a 
bill, the House Rules and Manual states that joint resolutions are used for “the in-
cidental, unusual, or inferior purposes of legislating.”253 One of those purposes is 
“notice to a foreign government of the abrogation of a treaty,”254 or “[a] resolu-
tion alleging an unconstitutional abrogation of a treaty by the President, and call-
ing on the President to seek the approval of Congress before such abrogation.”255 
Of course, congressional–executive agreements are not formed in the same 
way as treaties and therefore may not be subject to the same congressional rules 
for withdrawal or termination. However, if congressional sentiment about unilat-
eral presidential withdrawal is strong enough, Congress may choose to use the 
same procedure to express its disapproval of unilateral presidential withdrawal 
and clarify its intentions under the fast track statutory regime. 
246. 
247. DAVIS, supra note 245, at 1. 
248. Id. at 2. 
249. Id.; see also RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-706, BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS: 
EXAMPLES OF HOW EACH IS USED 2–3 (2010). 
250. DAVIS, supra note 245, at 2. 
251. 
252. S. Res. 15, 96th Cong. (1979); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 953–54 nn.11 & 
13 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
253. WICKHAM, supra note 245, at 206. 
254. See also id. at 317 (“Notice to a foreign government of the abrogation of a treaty is authorized 
by a joint resolution.”). 
255. Id. at 317. The relevant section of House Rules and Manual, which annotates Jefferson’s 
Manual, begins with the note that “[t]reaties being declared, equally with the laws of the United States, 
to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare them 
infringed and rescinded.” Id. The Supreme Court, of course, declined in Goldwater to decide whether 
this position is correct. See 444 U.S. at 997–98. 
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Notably, common justiciability concerns do not apply here—Congress is free 
to express its intention before notice has been delivered, or after it has taken 
effect. Although joint resolutions are subject to presidential veto, it would be 
politically awkward for the President to veto the resolution and would likely only 
place greater political pressure on him if he did so. 
Because a joint resolution has the effect of legislation, it would require a heav-
ier political lift than a simple or concurrent “Sense of” resolution. Because of its 
limited scope, however, the joint resolution would be easier than the most aggres-
sive option available to Congress: trade legislation that clarifies the locus of with-
drawal authority from congressional–executive trade agreements. 
3. Amendment to Fast Track Framework Statutes 
Although politically thorny, legislation that amends the Trade Act of 1974, the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, or both would be the most pre-
cise means of clarifying congressional intentions in this area.256 A legislative 
amendment to the fast track statutory regime would finish the job that Congress 
left undone in 1974 and 1988: conditioning the presidential power to enter into 
and withdraw from trade agreements upon Congressional consultation. 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 offers obvious prece-
dent for the 115th or 116th Congress to clarify its will and emphasize the need for 
inter-branch consultations in withdrawal from trade agreements.257 In that statute, 
Congress underscored the importance of presidential consultation with Congress 
in entering trade agreements, which had fallen off since 1974.258 Congress might 
protect its trade authority through legislation of limited scope that merely clarifies 
the consultation and approval procedure it expects the President to undertake 
before delivering notice of withdrawal from an agreement entered into under the 
authority of the 1974 and 1988 Acts. 
Passage of legislation, a joint resolution, or even a “Sense of” resolution might 
be ambitious to hope for from a Congress that is better known for its failure to 
act.259 Smaller voting blocs, however, might be able to exert significant political 
pressure on the President to begin consultations before delivering notice of with-
drawal. Because Congress might effectively curtail unilateral presidential action 
through threats of withholding votes on key legislation or on appropriations for 
programs that are pivotal to the President’s agenda, even a relatively small num-
ber of unified members of Congress could pose a credible threat. Although this 
result may smack of countermajoritarianism, it is part and parcel of politics in a 
256. See supra Part II. 
257. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901–3111 (2012); see also 
supra Section II.C. 
258. See S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 5–6 (1987). 
259. See generally Shi-Ling Hsu, Introduction: Environmental Law Without Congress, 30 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2014) (noting Congress’ failure to pass meaningful environmental legislation in 
twenty years); Evan Zoldan, Congressional Dysfunction, Public Opinion, and the Battle Over the 
Keystone XL Pipeline, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617, 617–18 (2015) (stating that President Obama’s 2015 
veto of the Keystone XL Approval Act reflects a general lack of congressional deliberation). 
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multibranch government and a multidistrict legislature. Moreover, these small 
voting blocs could do no more than push the President to consult with Congress 
before delivering notice. If the President judged that NAFTA withdrawal mat-
tered more to him politically than the votes that the objecting members threatened 
to withhold, he would still be free to deliver notice of withdrawal—and face the 
lawsuits that would inevitably ensue. 
B. STANDING: PRIVATE PARTIES VERSUS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 
Strategy over litigation to block unilateral presidential withdrawal from 
NAFTA is already being developed.260 
See David Lawder, Any Trump NAFTA Withdrawal Faces Stiff Court Challenge: Legal Experts, 
REUTERS, (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-trump-options/any- 
trump-nafta-withdrawal-faces-stiff-court-challenge-legal-experts-idUSKBN1DL2PK [https://perma.cc/ 
F2LY-8C9B]; William Mauldin, Lawyers Begin Sketching Legal Strategy to Challenge Possible NAFTA 
Withdrawal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawyers-begin- 
sketching-legal-strategy-to-challenge-possible-nafta-withdrawal-1508491805 [https://perma.cc/5FLE- 
LX28]. 
Because the matter involves a claim of 
aggrandizement of presidential power at the expense of Congress,261 the instinc-
tive reaction might be for members of Congress to bring suit, but that approach is 
likely foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. Byrd.262 In Raines, 
members of Congress sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item 
Veto Act.263 The Court held that the plaintiff members of Congress alleged no 
personal stake that was particularized to them, but merely an “institutional 
injury” that was “wholly abstract and widely dispersed” and “contrary to histori-
cal experience.”264 
That is not to say that legislators may never have standing; the Court in Raines 
distinguished its holding from Coleman v. Miller.265 In Coleman, members of the 
Kansas state legislature sought to challenge the legality of a tie-breaking vote 
cast by the Lieutenant Governor in favor of adding the “Child Labor 
Amendment” to the Federal Constitution.266 The Court held that the legislators 
had standing.267 It reasoned that the legislators’ claims were sufficiently concrete 
and particularized for Article III standing purposes because their votes against 
the amendment were “overridden” and “virtually held for naught” by the 
Lieutenant Governor’s allegedly unlawful action.268 
260. 
261. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
262. 521 U.S. 811, 820–29 (1997). 
263. The plaintiffs were four Senators and two Congressmen of the 104th Congress who voted “nay” 
on the Line Item Veto Act, which authorized the President to “cancel” certain spending and taxing 
measures after he had signed them into law. Id. at 814–15. See generally Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200. 
264. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. 
265. Id. at 821–26 (distinguishing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)). 
266. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435–36. 
267. Id. at 438, 446. 
268. Id. at 438; see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 823 (providing that, in Coleman, legislators’ votes were 
“completely nullified” by Lieutenant Governor’s allegedly unlawful action). 
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The injury to members of Congress in the NAFTA case would be much more 
akin to Raines than to Coleman, however. Members would be arguing not that 
their votes would have decided the law but for the President’s unlawful action, 
but merely that the President’s conduct aggrandized the power of the Executive 
Branch at the expense of Congress, causing a “widely dispersed” injury of an 
institutional rather than individualized nature. 
Moreover, at least one lower court has followed Raines to deny legislator 
standing in circumstances that more closely resemble the NAFTA controversy 
than either Raines or Coleman. In Kucinich v. Bush, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia held that members of Congress lacked standing to chal-
lenge President Bush’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty without the approval of Congress.269 The plaintiffs characterized their 
injury as being “deprived of their constitutional right and duty to participate in 
treaty termination,” which the court dismissed as “the same institutional injury as 
in Raines.”270 
Regardless, the NAFTA controversy offers the possibility of private plaintiffs 
and more traditional economic injuries that will likely be recognized as concrete 
and particularized. By ending a trade deal, a unilateral decision by the President 
to withdraw from NAFTA would occasion the loss of access to Canadian and 
Mexican markets, on which thousands of U.S. persons and businesses rely on in 
daily transactions. For this reason, courts have recognized standing for private 
parties in previous cases challenging trade-related decisions by the President. In 
Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit found that unions and a nonprofit group promoting American- 
made products had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the procedure 
used to enter into NAFTA.271 
Another case, involving trade sanctions against Nicaragua in the 1980s, gives 
slightly more pause, but still likely supports standing for a number of private per-
sons and businesses to challenge any NAFTA withdrawal. In Beacon Products 
Corp. v. Reagan, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts confirmed 
that plaintiffs who had contracts for sales to or from Nicaragua had standing to 
challenge the President’s imposition of trade sanctions on the Republic of 
Nicaragua.272 The court contrasted the plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the em-
bargo with their likely lack of standing to challenge the President’s unilateral 
withdrawal from the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN 
Treaty), an issue the court did not reach.273 The court’s view that plaintiffs likely 
269. 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2002). 
270. Id. at 6. 
271. 242 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he appellants have amassed considerable evidence . . . 
from which we may infer that U.S. reimposition of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade is by itself likely to 
result in somewhat reduced competition from foreign imports, thereby generating more demand for domestic 
production . . . in the industries represented by the appellant labor organizations.”). 
272. 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987). 
273. Beacon Prods. Corp., 633 F. Supp. at 1199 n.13 (“In light of this holding, the court does not 
reach the issue of plaintiffs’ standing.”). 
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lacked standing to make the latter claim was based on the plaintiffs’ failure to 
allege any deprivation of contract rights flowing directly from the treaty termina-
tion; plaintiffs had only alleged that the treaty termination would increase their 
business risk in Nicaragua.274 In contrast, plaintiffs challenging the President’s 
unilateral withdrawal from NAFTA could point to specific tariff increases or 
other trade barriers to export of their own products, or increases in costs of 
Canadian and Mexican products they plan to import, as a direct result of U.S. 
withdrawal from NAFTA. 
C. POLITICAL QUESTION: A MATTER OF TIMING 
Some cases questioning presidential authority touching on foreign affairs have 
been dismissed on political question grounds,275 but not always.276 Justice 
Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Goldwater v. Carter seems to reject any question 
that “involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s for-
eign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to 
negate the action of the President.”277 But in Baker v. Carr, the Court emphasized 
that “it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”278 Rather, the Court will consider in 
each case “the history of its management by the political branches, . . . its suscep-
tibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific 
case, and . . . the possible consequences of judicial action.”279 Nor does an inter- 
branch conflict necessarily render a case nonjusticiable, as a number of well- 
known Supreme Court cases illustrate (albeit most often outside the foreign 
relations context).280 
274. Id. 
275. E.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (plurality opinion) (finding congressional 
opposition to presidential treaty withdrawal to be nonjusticiable political question); Terlinden v. Ames, 
184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 1 (1849); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 19, 32–33 (1827). 
276. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (finding justiciable 
controversy as to whether Congress could mandate by statute that Secretary of State list “Israel” as place 
of birth on passport of U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 
478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (finding justiciable dispute over Secretary of Commerce’s decision regarding 
Secretary of Commerce’s enforcement of statute enacting international whaling quotas even though it 
would affect “the conduct of the Nation’s foreign relations”); The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 49 (1897); 
Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). 
277. 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
278. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
279. Id. at 211–12. 
280. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) (holding that Line Item Veto Act 
violated the Presentment Clause); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 773–74 (1996) (holding that 
presidential prescription of aggravating factors indicating death penalty in court-martial did not infringe 
Article III); Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 892 (1991) (holding that law 
allowing Chief Judge of federal Tax Court to appoint special trial judge to hear case and recommend 
opinion to Chief Judge did not violate Appointments Clause); United States v. Munoz–Flores, 495 U.S. 
385, 401 (1990) (holding that law mandating special assessments for federal misdemeanors was not a 
“[b]ill for raising Revenue” that must originate in the House of Representatives); Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654, 677, 684 (1988) (holding that Independent Counsel Act did not violate Appointments Clause 
or infringe on Article III powers of federal courts); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding 
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The Court in Baker outlined six factors for determining whether courts should 
leave a matter to the political Branches: whether there is (1) a “textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment” of the issue to a political Branch; (2) a “lack 
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards” to resolve the controversy; 
(3) no possibility of deciding the case without “an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) an unavoidable “lack of respect for 
the coordinate branches of government”; (5) an “unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence” to an earlier decision of the government; or (6) “the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question.”281 
The first three of these concerns are easily set aside in the NAFTA situation. 
First, far from a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” of the with-
drawal decision to the President, the Constitution commits at least as much 
authority over trade matters to Congress under the Foreign Commerce Clause.282 
Second, a decision by the Court would involve fairly conventional exercises in 
construing statutes (the NAFTA Implementation Act, the fast track statutes, and 
other trade agreement acts) and constitutional provisions (the Foreign Commerce 
Clause and the presidential foreign affairs power).283 And third, these decisions 
require strictly legal—not policy—determinations, which courts are well 
equipped to make. 
The Court’s 2012 decision in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton 
(Zivotofsky I) demonstrates that the Court does not view the political question doc-
trine as a talismanic bar to justiciability of all questions touching foreign affairs— 
including those involving competing policies of the political Branches.284 In 
Zivotofsky I, a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem to American parents sought to have 
“Jerusalem, Israel” listed on his passport as his place of birth.285 By statute, 
Congress had ordered the Secretary of State to list “Israel” as the place of birth at 
the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian.286 The State Department’s 
Foreign Affairs Manual, however, expressly prohibited passport officials from  
that Immigration and Nationality Act violated constitutional bicameralism and presentment 
requirements); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (holding that the 
President did not have constitutional authority to issue order to Secretary of Commerce to seize nation’s 
steel mills in contravention of procedures for emergency seizures of property established by Congress). 
One notable exception that did implicate foreign relations is Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 201 (holding that 
political question doctrine did not bar challenge to Secretary of State’s refusal to list “Israel” as place of 
birth on passport of citizen born to American parents in Jerusalem in compliance with Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act). 
281. 369 U.S. at 217. 
282. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 3. 
283. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 201. 
284. See id. 
285. Id. at 192–93. 
286. Id. at 191 (citing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107- 
228, § 214, 116 Stat. 1350, 1365 (2002)). 
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writing “Israel” or “Jordan” on the passports of citizens born in Jerusalem.287 The 
case involved highly sensitive foreign policy issues and turned on resolution of 
whether the President’s recognition power trumped Congress’s power over immi-
gration and nationality matters.288 Neither of these concerns presented an obsta-
cle. The Court noted that “[t]he federal courts are not being asked to supplant a 
foreign policy decision of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored 
determination of what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be. Instead, 
Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right.”289 
Interpretation of the underlying statutory and constitutional arguments is “a fa-
miliar judicial exercise.”290 The Court’s refusal in Zivotofsky I to adopt an abso-
lute bar to hearing all questions of a political nature supports the notion that a 
challenge to presidential withdrawal from NAFTA is not foreclosed by the politi-
cal questions doctrine. 
But the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors—which Justice Sotomayor charac-
terized as prudential in her concurrence in Zivotofsky I291—give more pause. 
Under those factors, courts may choose, for reasons of judicial efficiency, to hear 
cases that (4) would occasion a lack of respect for the other Branches; (5) demand 
an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence” to an earlier decision of the gov-
ernment; or (6) might result in “embarrassment” arising from different Branches 
of government speaking on the same question.292 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion emphasized that only the “rare case” will be non-
justiciable because of one of the three prudential factors outlined in Baker.293 
Many potential objections that arise from earlier cases are easily overcome in this 
context: for example, courts will not infer illicit motives by any Branch, but none 
are implied here.294 Courts will not second-guess decisions taken in exigent cir-
cumstances, but no urgent national security or foreign policy decisions are likely 
to precipitate NAFTA withdrawal.295 Nor will courts fill lacunae in constitutional 
287. Id. at 192 (citing 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1383 Ex. 1383.1, 1383.5- 
5 to .5-6 (1987)). 
288. See id. at 199. 
289. Id. at 196. 
290. Id.; see also id. at 201 (“Resolution of Zivotofsky’s claim demands careful examination of the 
textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute 
and of the passport and recognition powers. This is what courts do.”). 
291. Id. at 204. 
292. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
293. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 207; see also id. at 205–06 (stating that “[r]are occasions” presenting 
an “unusual case” may be nonjusticiable under the final three factors and abstention accommodates 
separation of powers concerns in “unusual cases”). 
294. Cf. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672–73 (1892) (declining to entertain 
possibility that presiding officers, clerks, and committees on enrolled bills of both Houses of Congress 
might conspire to enter bill not duly passed by Congress). 
295. Cf. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 1 (1849) (declining on political question grounds to consider 
legality of state recognition of charter government of Rhode Island during Dorr Rebellion); Martin v. 
Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 32–33 (1827) (declining on political question grounds to consider legality of 
President’s order to call out militia of State of New York during War of 1812). 
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provisions, but because congressional–executive agreements are not creatures of 
the Constitution, the only lacunae here are statutory.296 
The simple fact that NAFTA is an international agreement does not necessarily 
make presidential withdrawal a political question either. In Baker, the Court 
noted that “a court will not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty has been termi-
nated.”297 But the Court also noted that a court may nevertheless make such a 
determination “if there has been no conclusive ‘governmental action’” pursuant 
to it.298 In Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New 
Haven, the Court considered and rejected an argument that the War of 1812 oper-
ated to terminate the Treaty of Peace of 1783 between the United States and 
Great Britain.299 The Court’s decision to reach the question was ambitious, 
because it did set aside “conclusive government action”: the State of Vermont in 
1794 had reclaimed and redistributed land previously granted by the colonial 
government to a corporate citizen of Great Britain.300 Vermont pointed to the 
War of 1812 as a defense to the claim that its land policy violated the 1783 treaty, 
and the Supreme Court rejected that claim.301 If treaty termination will sometimes 
be a justiciable issue, prudential factors would seem to weigh in favor of constru-
ing presidential withdrawal from a congressional–executive agreement, because 
the President’s powers in that context derive mostly from statute and are cabined 
by the congressional power over foreign commerce. 
296. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (declining on political question grounds to 
decide whether Senate procedures were consistent with constitutional mandate to “try” impeachment 
cases). In the NAFTA context, the primary lacuna is that left by the vagueness of the withdrawal and 
termination provisions of the Fast Track statutes and the NAFTA Implementation Act. Underlying 
constitutional questions—the scope and relationship between the congressional foreign commerce clause 
and the presidential foreign affairs power—raise conventional separation-of-powers considerations that 
the Court has frequently decided. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
561 U.S. 477, 478–81 (2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 657–58 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714, 715–16 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 921–22 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
120–37 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 106, 293–95 (1926). 
297. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 212; see e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (plurality 
opinion) (declining to consider whether President was constitutionally empowered to unilaterally 
terminate defense treaty with Taiwan pursuant to recognition of government of People’s Republic of 
China); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) (declining to consider whether the incorporation 
of Prussia into the German Empire terminated the 1852 treaty between the United States and Prussia); 
Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (D. Mass. 1986) (declining to decide whether 
President was constitutionally empowered to unilaterally terminate Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation with Nicaragua), aff’d on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987). Cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 199, 260 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“[B]y the law of nations, we have no authority . . . to consider 
or declare [the 1783 Treaty of Peace] broken; but our judgment must be grounded on the solemn declaration 
of Congress alone, (to whom, I conceive, the authority is entrusted) given for the very purpose of vacating 
the treaty on the principles I have stated.”). 
298. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212. 
299. 21 U.S. 464 (1823). 
300. Id. at 466. 
301. Id. at 493–94. The Court’s statement in Baker is perhaps technically correct because Vermont 
argued that its law was actually based on the (incorrect) view that foreign corporate citizens were not 
entitled to hold land in the state; treaty termination was argued more as a defense to the petitioner’s 
argument that the Treaty invalidated the State’s action. Id. at 493. 
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Nevertheless, courts will refuse to consider cases that might cause an “embar-
rassment” to foreign relations owing to “multifarious pronouncements” from dif-
ferent Branches.302 It is unclear when courts would view this “embarrassment” 
concern to arise. Significantly, a notice of withdrawal under NAFTA Article 
2205 does not take effect until six months after delivery.303 Courts might view a 
lawsuit as justiciable after the notice has been given, but before it has taken 
effect.304 However, the Court in Baker worried not just about legalistically final 
actions, but also about “embarrassment” and “multifarious pronouncements” 
from different Branches.305 Once the President has sent notice of U.S. with-
drawal, courts may view this as a “pronouncement” to Mexico and Canada of U. 
S. intent to withdraw and may hesitate to differ.306 
But the Baker concern about differing statements from different Branches can 
be overstated. It is worth noting that the Framers effectively built a form of inter-
national “embarrassment” into the Constitution by dividing the treaty power 
between the President and the Senate.307 
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. As of August 28, 2018, there were forty two treaties pending 
before the Senate, including treaties submitted as long ago as 1949, 1982, and 1966. See Treaties 
Pending in the Senate (updated Aug. 28, 2018), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/ 
pending/ [https://perma.cc/F2WV-NK9B] (last updated Aug. 28, 2018). 
Of course, that embarrassment has been 
a source of deep concern for U.S. leaders and scholars, at least since the Senate’s 
rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, and may be partly responsible for the rise of 
the congressional–executive agreement.308 Still, the Treaty Clause illustrates that 
“multifarious pronouncements” were contemplated and encouraged by the 
Framers as an aspect of separation of powers. 
Courts could go either way on the political question issue, and timing will 
certainly be a factor. In Goldwater, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion explic-
itly refused to entertain the dispute between members of Congress and the 
President because the issue had not yet reached a “constitutional impasse.”309 
That case reached the Court after the Senate had introduced a resolution declar-
ing that Senate approval is necessary for treaty termination, but before it had 
voted.310 It was also unclear whether the resolution would be retroactive.311 
Justice Powell found this lack of “official action” by the Senate to be 
dispositive.312   
302. Id. at 217. 
303. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Can.–Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
304. Other scholars have made this point and still arrived at pessimistic conclusions about 
justiciability. See Hufbauer, supra note 54. 
305. 369 U.S. at 217. 
306. See supra Part I. 
307. 
308. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 837–40. 
309. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
310. See id. at 998. 
311. See id. 
312. See id. 
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The NAFTA situation is different. In the NAFTA case, the plaintiffs would 
claim that the President is violating his statutory authority under the Trade Act of 
1974 by withdrawing from NAFTA without consulting Congress. This claim 
would not be dependent on any resolution by the House or Senate, because the 
plaintiffs would claim that the President’s action violates the will already 
expressed by Congress in the fast track statutes. And because the ideal plaintiffs 
would be private parties rather than members of Congress, there would be no con-
cern that only a few members were prematurely expressing the will of the 
body.313 Timing may remain an insurmountable hurdle, however, if courts would 
not consider the action ripe until the President actually delivers the notice of with-
drawal without consulting Congress—at which point the prospect of “embarrass-
ment” becomes real, even if the withdrawal does not take effect for another six 
months.314 
D. BACK-DOOR CHALLENGE TO THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY THROUGH LITIGATION 
UNDER THE NAFTA IMPLEMENTATION ACT 
Another avenue of challenge remains available to plaintiffs aggrieved by unilat-
eral presidential withdrawal: as discussed in Part IV, plaintiffs challenging the 
continuation of the domestic obligations under the NAFTA Implementation Act 
may be able to argue that the statute does not terminate until “the United States” 
ceases to apply the agreement to Mexico or Canada—and that the President may 
not unilaterally act for “the United States” for the reasons discussed in Parts II and 
III. This argument invites the same statutory and constitutional analysis as a direct 
challenge to the President’s withdrawal power, but may more easily overcome po-
litical question hurdles because the remedies would be drastically different. In a 
direct challenge to the President’s withdrawal power, the remedy for finding that 
the President exceeded the scope of his powers would be to invalidate the 
President’s notice of withdrawal to Canada and Mexico. Even if decided before 
the effective date of that notice of withdrawal, the consequences would necessarily 
affect the relationship of the U.S. government with Mexico and Canada, perhaps 
causing the type of “embarrassment” that the Court feared in Baker. 
313. Cf. id. at 997–98. 
314. In this era of presidential tweets, one might argue that near-contemporaneous statements on 
Twitter by President Trump—that he intends to withdraw from NAFTA imminently—might cause the 
action to become ripe. Because this would (slightly) precede the notice of withdrawal, the action might 
ripen before any real international “embarrassment” can occur. Courts have taken notice of presidential 
tweets as statements of executive policy in other contexts. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 857 F.3d 4, 267 (4th Cir.) vacating as moot 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.) (recognizing 
President’s tweets about travel ban as official statements of federal policy); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 
741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir.), vacating as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.) (same); Doe v. Trump, 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 167, 213 (D.D.C. 2017) rev’d sub nom. Doe v. Shanahan, 2019 WL 102309 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 
2019)  (recognizing President’s tweet as announcement of federal policy prohibiting transgender 
individuals from serving in military). But a statement of policy is not the same as an executive action, 
and the latter would be needed to create a ripe controversy for court review. It is unlikely that even the 
most affirmative Twitter statement of presidential intention to withdrawal would be a viewed by a court 
as equivalent to withdrawal, creating a ripe controversy. 
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However, in a lawsuit construing the scope of the NAFTA Implementation 
Act’s termination clause, the remedy for a finding of presidential overreach 
would simply be that the termination clause is not triggered. The effect of this 
would be that the United States may withdraw from NAFTA based on the 
President’s notice of withdrawal for purposes of international law, but the trade 
obligations implemented into domestic law would continue in force. This result 
would not change the fact of U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA, but it would provide 
some relief to parties who stand to be injured by the loss of trade within North 
America because zero tariffs and other trade concessions would continue in force 
as a matter of domestic law. It would also complicate the political case for with-
drawal from NAFTA because the President would not be free to implement tariffs 
on Mexican and Canadian imports. Finally, it would likely galvanize Congress— 
in dialogue with the President—to amend the trade statutes to delineate the 
respective Branches’ powers to withdraw. This political resolution would be con-
sistent with the concerns of the political question doctrine by pushing the ultimate 
decision to the political Branches. 
CONCLUSION 
President Trump is free to deliver notice of withdrawal from NAFTA. But the 
better reading of both the statutory regime and the Constitution suggests that the 
President does not have the independent constitutional authority to withdraw 
from trade agreements and that Congress did not give such authority to him. And 
although the NAFTA Implementation Act appears designed to terminate auto-
matically upon U.S. withdrawal from the Agreement, it is unclear—and subject 
to challenge by private litigants—whether unilateral presidential withdrawal 
would constitute withdrawal by “the United States” if such action exceeds the 
President’s statutory and constitutional authority. 
If Congress agrees with this view and wishes to protect its constitutional 
authority to regulate foreign commerce, it has several options at its disposal to 
negate unilateral presidential withdrawal. If Congress fails to act, private litigants 
could try to overcome prudential doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and politi-
cal question considerations to have the President’s action declared unconstitu-
tional by the courts. It may be easier, however, for litigants to contest the 
automatic termination of the NAFTA Implementation Act on the grounds that 
unilateral presidential action is not withdrawal by “the United States.” If a court 
agrees, the domestic trade obligations would continue in force despite withdrawal 
from the Agreement and might prompt Congress to clarify the scope of the 
President’s withdrawal powers. 
Settling these questions has implications for NAFTA and beyond. Most imme-
diately, if serious challenge to unilateral presidential withdrawal can be mounted 
or even articulated, the President will be less able to use the threat of withdrawal 
as a bullwhip to exact concessions from NAFTA partners. In the bigger picture, 
the current prospect of unilateral presidential withdrawal from trade agreements 
may cause anxiety among potential trade partners that any agreements will be 
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built on the shifting sands of the latest presidential election. Ruling out such a uni-
lateral prerogative may encourage the formation of future trade agreements, 
including the bilateral agreements the Trump Administration itself purports to 
favor.315  
315. See, e.g., Don Lee, Trump Wants to Cut Bilateral Trade Deals, But What if Nobody Comes to 
the Table?, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2017, 1:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-trade- 
strategy-20170526-story.html [https://perma.cc/U2DN-BQ55]. 
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